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Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis is to examine how a supranational institution acts in a policy field marked 
by a high degree of intergovernmental decision-making (i.e. decision-making between Member 
State governments). It analyses the strategies the European Commission applied in one case in 
the area of tax policy, namely the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) 
proposal; drawing on the principal-agent approach as the theoretical underpinning. Based on 
documentary analysis and relevant secondary material, it finds that the Commission as the agent 
used seven different strategies in this case, and that they can be grouped into three types: the 
confrontational, cooperative and persuasive type. It moreover finds that there are strategies 
which are predominant in different phases of the development of the proposal, spanning from 
2001-2014. In the initial phase, the Commission mainly applied strategies of the confrontational 
and the persuasive type; the mid-phase was dominated by cooperative strategies, while the phase 
after the proposal was issued was mainly characterised by persuasive strategies. By providing a 
comprehensive analysis of the agent’s strategies, the thesis makes a valuable contribution to the 
strand of principal-agent literature which focuses on the agent’s behaviour; as well as to the 
political science literature on tax policy.  
KEY WORDS: Principal-agent approach, agent strategies, EU tax policy, direct taxation, 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) 
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1. Introduction 
 
Taxation is an important area for nation states, as the biggest share of their revenues 
stems from raising taxes and because it serves important social and economic functions. 
Each and every citizen and business is affected by tax policy; and the state’s adequate 
collection of taxes, the righteousness of public spending, as well as legitimate ways to 
decide upon these issues are discussed vividly in every society. Taxation thus directly 
touches upon national sovereignty and European Union (EU) Member States are 
therefore highly reluctant to give up competences in this field (Cuenca Garcia et al. 2013: 
p.44). However, despite the salience of tax policy, this contested area has not received 
sufficient attention in political science in general (Jensen 2008: p.207) and in studies on 
the European Union more specifically (Genschel/Jachtenfuchs 2009a: p.7). 
The area of taxation remains largely in the Member States’ responsibility and the 
European Union only has supplementary functions (Lucian/Lucian Alexandru 2011: 
649). It cannot, for example, raise its own taxes (Genschel/Jachtenfuchs 2009a: p.12). 
The legal basis for EU legislation in taxation are Articles 113 and 115 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which provide for directives to be 
adopted by unanimity, meaning that all Member States need to agree in order for a 
proposal to be adopted. Legislation in this area is, however, subject to the condition that it 
is necessary in order to ensure the establishment and functioning of the Internal Market
1
 
and to avoid distortion of competition.  
Taxation is thus marked by a high degree of intergovernmental decision-making 
(Genschel/Jachtenfuchs 2009a: pp.13). Nevertheless, the European Union shapes this 
highly sensitive policy area to a considerable extent, by regulating Member States’ tax 
bases, tax rates and even their entire tax systems (ibid.: p.1). Moreover, the frequency of 
European Union legislative acts in the tax area has increased in the past decades, 
especially after the introduction of the Internal Market, reaching from indirect taxation 
such as Value-Added-Tax (VAT) and excise duties on products such as alcohol, tobacco 
and energy, to direct taxation such as company and personal income taxes, more recently 
(Kemmerling 2010: p.1060).  
It has been claimed that supranational institutions have used the mandate to ensure the 
functioning of the Internal Market in order to increase their influence in taxation 
(Genschel/Jachtenfuchs 2009a: pp.12). The puzzle underlying this thesis is therefore how 
a supranational player acts in an area shaped by intergovernmental decision-making, 
where there is only limited scope for EU action. A supranational actor worth analysing in 
this respect is the European Commission, due to its special role as the initiator of 
                                                          
1
 Throughout the history of the European Union, different expressions have been in place for the Internal 
Market in different periods of time; namely common market and single market (Chalmers et al. 2011: 
p.675). For the sake of simplicity, the thesis refers to all of them as “Internal Market”. 
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European Union legislation and its function as the “guardian of the treaties” (Tallberg 
2003: p.3), thereby inter alia responsible for the functioning of the Internal Market 
(Hix/Høyland 2011: pp.193).  
The aim of the thesis is to show with the help of theoretical input and an empirical case 
study what kind of strategies the European Commission applies in the contested tax 
policy area. The main theoretical underpinning the thesis draws upon is the principal-
agent approach. The Commission’s2 strategies applied in the tax area are analysed 
through the lenses of a principal-agent relationship, whereas the Member States are 
conceptualised as the principals and the Commission as the agent. As it goes beyond the 
scope of this paper to scrutinise Commission strategies in the area of taxation as a whole, 
a case is chosen and examined in-depth. The selected case is the Commission’s proposal 
on the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) issued in March 2011. 
Thus, the thesis aims at answering the following research question:  
What kind of strategies has the European Commission pursued to attain its preferences in 
the case of the proposal on the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base?  
Drawing on the theoretical underpinning, it is assumed that the Commission’s 
preferences are first, to increase EU competences in the area of taxation and second, to 
increase its own competences and influence within this process. The main empirical 
material used to analyse this case are primary documents such as Commission 
communications, working papers, statements and speeches. The main secondary sources 
this thesis draws upon are academic literature, reports and newspaper articles. The 
timeframe of analysis spans from 2001 to 2014.  
 
1.1. Delimitations 
It is important to note what kind of issues are out of the scope of the thesis. First, it is not 
the aim of this paper to examine the question how successful the Commission was in 
pursuing its strategies in the tax area. The sole focus is on outlining what kind of 
strategies the Commission applied when aiming at the attainment of its preferences. 
Second, not the whole tax area is accounted for; only a specific case in one particular 
sub-area of taxation (direct taxation/company taxation) is taken into consideration. Third, 
the thesis does not focus on Member States and their strategies for constraining and 
controlling the Commission. They are only insofar accounted for as to analyse how the 
latter reacts to strategies applied by them.  
 
                                                          
2
 The term “Commission” refers to the European Commission. The two expressions are used 
interchangeably for the purpose of this thesis. Moreover, it is not distinguished between “Commission of 
the European Communities”, as this institution was called earlier, and “European Commission”. 
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1.2. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. Following this introduction, an overview of the 
European Commission and its competences is given. The chapter contributes to the 
understanding of the Commission as an actor. Chapter 3 offers a brief overview of first, 
tax policy and its developments, focusing especially on direct taxation; and second, of the 
literature on taxation in the European Union. This serves the purpose of providing 
information about the policy area subject to the analysis later on in this paper. The next 
chapter (Chapter 4) outlines the research design, methodology and methods applied in 
this thesis, as well as a justification of the choices taken. In Chapter 5, the theoretical 
approach underlying this thesis – the principal-agent approach - is described. Moreover, 
Commission strategies are identified from the theory and the choice of theoretical 
underpinning is justified. The CCCTB case is presented and the theory applied to it in 
Chapter 6. The actual empirical analysis follows in Chapter 7. The findings are discussed 
and strategies are categorised in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 contains conclusions, further 
discussions, and an outlook on possible future research topics.  
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2. Overview of the European Commission’s competences 
 
In this chapter, a brief overview of the European Commission’s core competences in the 
legislative process is offered. This is followed by a short justification of the Commission 
as the research object of this thesis. The chapter provides the necessary background 
knowledge about what kind of actor the Commission is and what competences it has.  
 
 
2.1. The main competences of the European Commission  
The Commission’s main responsibilities are laid down in Article 17(1) and (2). It is in 
general responsible for the promotion of the general interests of the EU, to oversee the 
application of Union law and for proposing new legislation (Chalmers et al. 2011: p.59). 
The Commission enjoys agenda setting powers, as legal acts may only be adopted 
following a proposal from this actor. It can moreover withdraw a proposal at any time 
(ibid.: pp.61). Moreover, the Commission has legislative and quasi-legislative powers. 
While it has very few direct legislative powers, it enjoys certain quasi-legislative powers 
which are delegated to it from the Council
3
 and concern the non-essential parts of a 
policy (ibid.: pp.59). This is laid down in Article 290 TFEU. It can furthermore, by 
bringing non-compliant Member States in infringement proceedings before the European 
Court of Justice for breeching EU law, exert supervisory powers (ibid. p.64). Article 258 
TFEU provides the legal basis for this.  
 
 
2.2. Justification of the choice of the Commission as research object 
Taking the research aim of this thesis – analysing supranational actors’ strategies – into 
account, the Commission is considered as the most suited research object among the 
other institutions at supranational level, namely the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and 
the European Parliament (EP). First, as outlined above, it fulfils many important 
functions. It initiates legislation, exerts legislative and quasi-legislative powers and brings 
Member States before the European Court of Justice for non-compliant behaviour. These 
functions are unique to the European Commission and therefore, this actor seems most 
suited when studying a supranational actor’s strategies. It is an actor with its very own 
political agenda, while the ECJ can be considered as a more politically independent 
                                                          
3
 Whenever this thesis refers to “Council” it is the Council of the European Union that is meant.  
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judicial actor (Radaelli/Kramer 2008: p.317).
4
 Studying strategies implies that the actor 
has own preferences and an agenda which it pursues. This makes the ECJ less appropriate 
for the purpose of this thesis. The EP has been discarded as a research object in this 
thesis, as its competences in the tax area are scarce. It only needs to be consulted by the 
Council in this area (Loyens&Loeff 2012: p.1) and its opinion can simply be ignored by 
the Member States. The Commission is therefore considered to be the most suited 
research object in the context of this thesis.  
  
                                                          
4
 There is a debate among legal scholars whether the ECJ is a political actor in favour of tax harmonisation. 
However, as noted by Radaelli/Kraemer (2008: p.317), most European legal scholars do not consider the 
ECJ as an actor with its own political agenda, although it has, without doubt, contributed to the field of 
direct taxation through its case law. 
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3. Overview of EU tax policy  
 
This chapter provides an overview of the area of taxation. It first outlines the legal basis, 
the development and the current status of tax policy in the European Union, before the 
academic literature on taxation in the EU is briefly reviewed. At the end of this chapter, a 
short justification on the choice of research area is given. The chapter aims at providing 
an understanding of the policy area, which is a necessary pre-condition for the 
consequent parts of the thesis.  
 
 
3.1.  Legal basis, development and current status of EU tax policy 
A few things are important to note when writing about taxation in the European Union. It 
should be first of all borne in mind that the EU does not have the right to levy its own 
taxes, i.e. it does not have the power to tax (Genschel/Jachtenfuchs 2009a: p.12). Thus, 
when speaking about tax policy in the EU, it is approximation and harmonisation of 
national laws that is referred to. Complete harmonisation of national tax laws (i.e. that the 
same tax rules and rates are applicable in all Member States) is politically not possible 
(Chalmers et al. 2011: p.683) and not on the political agenda at the moment, given the 
considerable discrepancies in the tax systems and views on taxation in the different 
Member States.  
It is furthermore important to differentiate between indirect and direct taxation. Indirect 
taxation refers to Value-Added-Tax (VAT) on goods and services, as well as excise 
duties, a tax levied on goods such as tobacco products, alcoholic beverages and energy 
products. They are thus taxes on consumption, collected by for example the seller of the 
products on behalf of the government. Direct taxes are taxes which are directly paid to 
the government. The most important ones are Company Income Tax (CIT)
5
 and Personal 
Income Tax (PIT). 
The most relevant articles for EU action in the area of taxation are Articles 113 and 115 
TFEU. While Article 113 TFEU gives the European Commission a mandate to propose 
directives in the area of indirect taxation in order to ensure the establishment and 
functioning of the Internal Market, no clear corresponding mandate exists in the area of 
direct taxation.  
However, for legislation in this area, Article 115 TFEU is used as a legal basis. This 
article provides for the following:  
                                                          
5 For the purpose of this thesis, the terms ‘company’ and ‘corporate’ income tax are used interchangeably. 
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Without prejudice to Article 114, the Council shall, acting unanimously in accordance with a 
special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Committee, issue directives for the approximation of such laws, regulations or 
administrative provisions of the Member States as directly affect the establishment or functioning 
of the internal market (Article 115 TFEU, emphasis added). 
As can be seen from its wording, this article is of a more general nature and direct 
taxation is not explicitly mentioned. Moreover, it only allows for an ‘approximation’ of 
laws, which is less far reaching than ‘harmonisation’ as provided for in Article 113 
TFEU. However, as the different tax systems of the Member States often clash in cross-
border situations and hence distort the functioning of the Internal Market, Article 115 
TFEU is considered to be a sufficient basis for EU legislation in this area (Vascega/van 
Thiel 2012: p.14).  
On the basis of these two provisions, some significant steps have been taken in the area of 
taxation. Tax policy in the EU dates back to the 1960s, starting with measures to 
gradually harmonise indirect taxation and stretching more and more into the area of direct 
taxation. EU action in the area of taxation was considered as necessary, since the customs 
barriers to cross-border trade which had gradually been removed should not be replaced 
by tax barriers (Tyc 2008: p.87). In indirect taxation, the most important steps were the 
harmonisation of turnover taxes of the Member States by introducing a Value-Added-Tax 
(Aujean 2012: pp.135); and the introduction of EU legislation on excise duties on 
manufactured tobacco, alcohol and alcoholic beverages, as well as mineral oils (Cnossen 
2002: p.33).  
As regards direct taxation, the Commission as early as in the 1960s attempted to call 
upon harmonising corporate tax systems, bases and rates. These attempts were however 
rejected by the Council and therefore, relevant steps in this direction were first taken in 
the 1990s. The progressing of the Single Market Programme in the 1990s has 
subsequently led to the adoption of the first directives ever in the field of corporate 
taxation: the Parent-Subsidiary
6
 and the Merger
7
 Directives in 1990, as well as the 
Interests and Royalties Directive
8
 in 2003. In 2011, the European Commission proposed 
the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base - the case study of this thesis - in order to 
remove remaining obstacles in the field of corporate taxation (Genschel et al. 2011: 
pp.595). In the area of personal income taxation, the most important legal act is the 
Savings Directive adopted in 2003 (Genschel/Jachtenfuchs 2009b: p.12).  
                                                          
6
 The Parent-Subsidiary Directive aims at preventing double-taxation on dividends distributed by European 
subsidiaries to their European parent company (Deloitte General Services 2013: p.1).  
7
 The main aim of the Merger Directive is to abolish tax obstacles to cross-border business reorganisations 
(European Commission 2014a).  
8
 The Interest and Royalties Directive concerns the taxation of interest (i.e. the income on loans) and 
royalty payments (i.e. money that is paid for the use of an artistic work such as music or books every time it 
is sold or performed) between associated companies situated in different Member States. Its main purpose 
is to remove tax obstacles in the area of cross-border payments of interests and royalties (European 
Commission 2014b).  
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Despite these developments, the number of acts is significantly lower in this field than in 
the area of indirect taxation. This relatively low number of acts in direct taxation can be 
explained by the assumption that direct taxation has less potential to distort the market 
than indirect taxation (Genschel/Jachtenfuchs 2009a: p.17) and therefore, EU legislation 
may seem less justifiable.  
It can in general be noted that progress in the area of taxation has been slow, as this is a 
highly contentious and sensitive policy field and agreements are only reached after long 
and difficult negotiations, or even not at all.
9
 Moreover, progress in the direct tax field 
has even been more cumbersome than in the indirect one.  
 
 
3.2. Overview of the literature on taxation 
This section provides a short overview of the literature on EU tax policy, concentrating 
primarily on political science contributions.  
The issues literature on EU tax policy inter alia focuses on range from the role of the EU 
in constraining Member States’ tax policies (e.g. Genschel/Jachtenfuchs 2009a; 2009b), 
to tax competition in the EU (e.g. Genschel et al. 2011; Ganghof/Genschel 2008; 
Holzinger 2005) and the effect of Europeanisation on the convergence of national tax 
policies (e.g. Kemmerling 2010).  
The theoretic (political science) concepts applied to this area are governance approaches 
(e.g. Genschel/Jachtenfuchs 2009a; 2009b; Radaelli/Kraemer 2008), Europeanisation 
theory (e.g. Kemmerling 2010), rational choice approaches (e.g. Holzinger 2005), as well 
as the open method of coordination (e.g. Radaelli 2003). The contributions from the 
political science field focus on a variety of different taxes. While some deal with the most 
important direct and indirect ones (e.g. Genschel/Jachtenfuchs 2009a; Kemmerling 
2010), others address more specific direct taxes such as business taxation (e.g. Genschel 
et al. 2011; Radaelli 2003).  
Approaches focusing on actors and their preferences prevail in the political science 
literature (e.g. Genschel et al. 2011; Kemmerling 2010). Some studies also analyse the 
role of actor’s strategies in shaping this area (e.g. Kemmerling 2010; Radaelli/Kraemer 
2008). Radaelli/Kraemer (2008) for example explain tax cooperation by analysing how 
governance arenas emerge (p.318). They argue that political strategy pursued by the 
Commission has shaped two of these arenas, where different definitions of tax problems 
                                                          
9
 Throughout the history of tax policy in the EU, the Commission had to withdraw proposals several times 
due to the Council ignoring tabled proposals and a subsequent lack of progress in this area. This concerned 
for example a Directive on the harmonisation of systems of company taxation and of withholding taxes on 
dividends (European Commission 1990: p.13).  
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apply and where actors are empowered to differing degrees (ibid.: p.315; p.325). They 
furthermore outline the preferences of the most important actors in the tax area: the 
Member States, the Commission and the business community (ibid.: pp.319).  
While the above mentioned authors have made important contributions to the field, it is 
nevertheless disappointing that the literature in the area of taxation is so scarce. Political 
science seems to have largely left this field to other disciplines such as economic and 
judicial science, despite the fact that it can provide valuable insights, for example by 
enriching the debate with the focus on actors and their preferences in explaining policy 
processes and outcomes and by drawing on political science theory.  
Two important points can be stressed following this short overview of the literature. First, 
the European Union level matters in shaping EU tax policy, as contributions on the issue 
have found that supranational institutions and the Internal Market considerably affect 
Member States. Second, the literature review on contributions from political science has 
shown that it is important to focus on actors and their respective preferences.  
 
 
3.3. Justification of the choice of topic  
According to King et al. (1994: pp.15), a research project should fulfil several criteria. 
First, a research topic should be important in the real world, i.e. a topic that has an impact 
on many people. Second, a research project should make a contribution to the scholarly 
literature and it should not duplicate what has already been done.  
Having these two points in mind, the choice of research topic can be justified as follows. 
Taxation is an area which concerns and affects each and every citizen and businesses and 
their daily lives and routines. EU action in this area thus has an effect on each of us and is 
therefore worth examining further. From a political viewpoint it is decisive to know what 
kind of strategies a supranational body like the Commission applies in order to influence 
the policy-making process, as this question touches upon the very sensitive question of 
democratic legitimacy. The Commission itself is not elected by the people, it is therefore 
not directly accountable to them and not concerned with re-election issues (Conceição-
Heldt 2011: p.409). Knowing about the strategies this actor applies in pursuing its 
preferences and influencing the policy-making process is therefore the necessary first step 
of potentially controlling this institution, anticipating its next actions and holding it 
accountable. What is more, despite the importance of taxation as the main revenue source 
for nation states, it has been found that this area has not received sufficient attention in 
academia; and political scientists in particular have largely ignored this issue area. 
Further contributions to this research strand are therefore necessary.  
  
10 
 
4. Research design, methodology and chosen method  
 
This chapter provides an overview of the research design, methodology and the chosen 
method applied in the study. The first part presents the research design and methodology 
of this thesis, including the selected case and reasons for this choice. The second part 
outlines the chosen method and empirical material the analysis is based on. In the third 
section, the approach is justified and methodological challenges briefly discussed.  
 
 
4.1.  Research design and methodology  
As far as the methodology is concerned, it is at first decisive to define what is meant by 
this term. A methodology is a set of methods and principles used in a certain field of 
research. Perri 6 and Christine Bellamy conceptualise methodology as a means of linking 
empirical observations and the adequacy of a theory. Thus, a methodology shows the 
researcher what conclusions can be drawn from the findings produced by methods such as 
statistical analyses, interviews and in-depth analyses (6/Bellamy 2012: pp.1-3).  
One kind of qualitative method are in-depth case studies, which offer a variety of 
advantages. First, they are sensitive to the context of a case and therefore, they allow 
researchers to develop an in-depth understanding of the context, as well as of the case 
itself (6/Bellamy 2012: p.104; George/Bennett 2005: p.19). Applied to the thesis, 
studying a specific case is considered useful in order to learn more about the 
Commission’s preferences in tax policy (the context) and what strategies the Commission 
pursued in this case (the actual case).  
Moreover, case studies are particularly suited to analyse how processes work (6/Bellamy 
2012: p.104). The case study applied in this thesis should therefore be appropriate to 
understand how the Commission acted within a longer process, in order to find out 
whether differences in this actor’s behaviour occur over time.  
Third, insights gained through case studies may contribute to the theoretical underpinning 
(6/Bellamy 2012: p.104; George/Bennett 2005: p.21). Theory is not static, but rather 
subject to potential changes when the empirical material found suggests so. As the aim of 
this case study is to contribute to and expand the knowledge on the Commission’s 
strategies from a principal-agent viewpoint, this approach is considered appropriate.  
One of the biggest disadvantages of case studies is, however, that it is not possible to 
draw general conclusions from them, i.e. the findings of one case in one policy area 
might not be applicable to other areas or situations, and not even to another case within 
11 
 
the same area (6/Bellamy 2012: p.105; George/Bennett 2005: p.30). This point should be 
kept in mind and further discussed towards the end of this thesis.  
Despite this drawback, highlighting one specific case is considered as a suitable way of 
demonstrating how the Commission acts in this area. According to George/Bennett 
(2005: p.17) a case can be defined as “an instance of class of events”, while class of 
events refers to “a phenomenon of scientific interest” (ibid.). Applied to the thesis, the 
class of events is tax policy, while the specific instance, thus the proposed case for this 
purpose, is the Commission’s proposal on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB), which was launched on March 16, 2011. The basic idea dates back until the 
early 2000s. However, a decision on this proposal is still pending.  
This case has been chosen for several reasons. It can be argued that it represents a crucial 
case, which is a “most difficult test for an argument and hence provides what is, arguably, 
the strongest sort of evidence possible in a nonexperimental, single-case setting” (Gerring 
2007: p.232). As outlined in the theory section below, the main argument underlying this 
thesis is that supranational actors are agents applying strategies in order to pursue their 
own agendas. The case is considered as crucial for a variety of reasons. 
First, the Commission (the “agent” in principal-agent terminology) has very strong 
preferences in this area, since the elimination of discriminatory cross-border situations 
and reduction of tax compliance costs
10
 for businesses - the main aims of the proposed 
directive - rank high on its agenda (European Commission 2001a: pp.15). Strategies to 
attain its preferences are therefore expected to be particularly visible in this case.  
Second, certain Member States (the “principals”) very strongly oppose this proposal, as 
they fear losses of tax revenues, increased costs of administering the proposed system for 
their respective national tax authorities, increased tax competition, as well as an 
infringement of the principle of subsidiarity in the EU (Van der Jagt 2012: p.2; 
Aujean/von Frenckell 2011; Rautenstrauch 2012: p.10). Thus, considering that some 
Member States’ resistance is quite tough in this case, it is expected that the Commission 
has had to intensify its efforts and that strategies are therefore more apparent than in 
other, less disputed ones.  
Third, and maybe most important, this case is particularly relevant because the proposal 
on the CCCTB is one of the few in the area of direct taxation. Considering that the 
Commission does not even have a direct mandate to propose legislation in this area of 
taxation (the proposed directive builds upon Article 115 TFEU, which is of a more 
general nature and provides that measures can only be taken when the functioning of the 
Internal Market is distorted), this field provides a difficult setting for Commission action. 
It is therefore expected that it has had to ‘fight’ even harder to attain its preferences.  
                                                          
10
 The term “tax compliance costs” refers to the costs businesses incur when complying with tax 
regulations, excluding the costs of the taxes themselves (European Commission 2013a: p.3). This could for 
example include time spent by employees and/or material costs.  
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4.2.  Chosen method and empirical material 
How were the strategies applied by the Commission identified? The thesis employs a 
deductive/theory-driven approach (Fägersten 2010: p.118) using documentary analysis. 
This means that strategies were identified from the relevant theoretic literature first, 
before the empirical material was screened for evidence for these strategies. A deductive 
approach does, however, not preclude the possibility of supplementing the theory when 
evidence found in the empirical world suggests so (ibid.).  
The tool developed for this analysis consisted of a table containing names of the various 
strategies found in the relevant principal-agent literature, guiding questions for the 
analysis, and operationalisation of the strategies. Table 1 in Chapter 5 shows the analysis 
tool. The relevant documents were screened for evidence pointing to these strategies. If 
evidence for a strategy was found, a note was made in the analysis tool. At the end, this 
left the researcher with a data set of ten different documents on the CCCTB, ranging from 
2001 until 2011, filled with evidence for the various strategies, which built the basis for 
the subsequent written analysis. A list of the analysed documents can be found in Annex 
A.  
As noted by Diekmann (2007: p.577), it is important to employ a systematic approach 
when analysing documents. Applied to this case, this means that all identified relevant 
primary documents issued by the Commission which are open to public access and 
concerned with company taxation and the CCCTB have been systematically analysed. It 
is assumed that these documents reflect the Commission’s positions and preferences. 
These documents were supplemented by evidence found from sources such as speeches, 
academic and newspaper articles, as well as reports and papers on the CCCTB. It is also 
accounted for the time after the last Commission document was issued in 2011. The 
timeframe of analysis is thus 2001-2014.  
 
 
4.3.  Justification of the chosen approach 
As outlined above, the case study approach offers a variety of advantages. It allows for 
in-depth analysis and identification of as many strategies as possible. According to Mark 
Pollack (1997: p.10), case studies are among the most suitable research approaches in 
principal-agent relations, as they allow to outline the actors’ preferences, which is - as we 
shall see below - very important in principal-agent analysis. This is moreover the main 
reason why a single case was chosen, instead of several cases for comparison. First, 
comparison is not considered feasible due to practical considerations. Case studies 
require thorough knowledge about the issue area, and this restricts the number of cases 
that are manageable (Fägersten 2010: p.121). Moreover, case comparison would not 
13 
 
contribute much to the aim of the study, as it does not aim at explaining differences in 
strategies applied in various cases, but rather to analyse them in-depth.  
Regarding the method, documentary analysis has been found to be the most useful 
method for the purpose of the thesis. Interviews with Commission officials as empirical 
material have been deliberately discarded for several reasons. First, the whole process of 
developing the CCCTB proposal reaches back until the late 1990s and potential 
interviewees may have difficulties remembering something in detail that happened 
around 15 years ago. These “lapses of memory” (Tansey 2007: p.10) are a serious 
disadvantage and therefore, the written word in form of documents and other written 
sources is considered more reliable in this respect. Second, it is also difficult to identify 
the responsible officials who participated in this process and who could contribute to the 
research with their knowledge. Some of them might not even work at the Commission 
anymore, or not in the tax area. Third, and maybe most important, potential interviewees 
might not be willing to share sensitive information with the public (Bailer 2014: p.50), 
including information about the Commission’s ‘real’ intentions. The researcher might 
therefore have ended up with material she could have found in official documents 
anyway. Interviews were therefore not considered suitable for the purpose of this thesis.  
Arguably, there are some methodological challenges related to the chosen approach. 
Drawing on accessible documents only means that it is not possible to account for more 
informal, publicly not accessible strategies, such as potential negotiation and bargaining 
techniques the Commission applies when interacting with Member States. Moreover and 
as already outlined above, it is difficult to measure the Commission’s true preferences 
and intentions. For the purpose of this thesis, they are derived from principal-agent 
assumptions; which might not necessarily reflect the real situation.  
Despite these restrictions, the chosen approach is considered to be the most appropriate 
given the mentioned limitations research projects like the one at hand are constrained by. 
   
14 
 
5. Theoretical underpinning  
 
This chapter outlines the theoretical underpinning this thesis draws on. In the first section, 
the principal-agent approach, its core concepts and assumptions are described, and the 
core presumptions about the Commission as an agent underlying this thesis presented. 
The second section provides an overview of the Commission’s strategies identified in the 
principal-agent literature. In the last section, the choice of theoretical approach is briefly 
justified.  
 
 
5.1.  Principals and agents: overview, main assumptions and core concepts  
Theory helps us to structure and gain a deeper understanding of findings from the 
empirical world; an understanding we would not be able to acquire when looking at the 
‘facts’ alone (Wiener/Diez 2009: p.4). The theory chosen for the analysis of Commission 
strategies in taxation is the principal-agent approach, which is a sub-area of rational 
choice institutionalism. In European integration theory, it aims at resolving the conflict 
between neofunctionalism (which claims that supranational institutions enjoy substantial 
autonomy) and intergovernmentalism (which claims that EU Member State governments 
are in control) by assuming that supranational institutions’ autonomy varies over time and 
across issue areas (Tallberg 2000: p. 844). It does not categorically state that one of these 
parties is more important or influential than the other and it thus offers a more nuanced 
approach (Kassim/Manon 2003: p.125). 
The principal-agent approach focuses on the relationship between principals and agents. 
A principal (mostly conceptualised as a nation state) is an actor who delegates certain 
tasks to an agent (most commonly international organisations). In research about the 
European Union, the collective principal is in most instances represented by the Member 
States, while the agent is conceptualised as a supranational institution such as the 
European Commission – a constellation which is most common in the respective 
literature (see for example Pollack 1994, 1997, Cini 1999; Conceição-Heldt 2010, 2011, 
2013; Mügge 2011; Delreux/Kerremans 2011; Niemann/Huigens 2011; Schmidt 2000) – 
and/or, although to a lesser extent, the European Court of Justice (see for example 
Tallberg 2000, 2003). However, there are also studies which conceptualise the 
relationship the other way around, with the European Commission representing the 
principal and the Member States representing the multiple agents (see for example 
Barbone/Poniatowski 2013 on the Economic and Monetary Union or Blom-Hansen 2005 
on European cohesion policy).  
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Scholars applying this approach to the European Union setting have scrutinised a variety 
of different policy fields, such as trade policy/trade negotiations and foreign economic 
policy (e.g. Conceição-Heldt 2010, 2011, 2013, Delreux/Kerremans 2010; Dür/Elsig 
2011; Reichert/Jungblut 2007), cohesion policy (e.g. Blom-Hansen 2005), global 
financial governance (e.g. Mügge 2011) and the Economic and Monetary Union 
(Barbone/Poniatowski 2013). To the author’s best knowledge, this approach has so far 
never been applied to the field of taxation.  
Several main assumptions underlie the principal-agent approach. As it builds on rational 
choice presumptions, it is assumed that principals and agents are rational actors (Tallberg 
2003: p.16) who have a certain set of preferences (ibid.; Conceição-Heldt 2011: p.404). 
In every principal-agent analysis it is thus important to identify the principals’ and the 
agent’s preferences in order to understand what they are aiming to achieve and what kind 
of strategies they apply. Another core assumption of this approach is that agents are 
actors having their very own preferences and that they strategically pursue their own 
agendas (Hawkins et al. 2006: p.5), which may differ from their principals’. It is 
moreover assumed that there is an informational asymmetry between the agent and the 
principal(s). As the agent knows more about its preferences, intentions and actions than 
the principals do, this informational advantage can be used for its own purposes (Tallberg 
2000: pp.845). 
There is a variety of core concepts which need to be defined in order to understand the 
approach. First, the concept of delegation is “a conditional grant of authority from a 
principal to an agent that empowers the latter to act on behalf of the former” (Hawkins et 
al. 2006: p.7). Thus, the principal delegates certain tasks to an agent, thereby allowing it 
to act on behalf of it. This grant of authority is limited in time and scope and can be 
revoked by the principal. Principals decide to delegate authority to their agents because 
they expect certain advantages from delegation, such as a specialised agent with expert 
knowledge, who facilitates collective decision-making, helps to resolve disputes which 
result from incomplete contracts, and increases the credibility of the principals’ decisions 
(ibid.: pp.12-19).  
If agents do not act in a way that is desired by principals, agency losses (agency slack) 
occur (ibid.: p.8). In order to account for this, principals can establish control 
mechanisms. Two of these mechanisms most commonly mentioned in the respective 
literature are monitoring and reporting requirements such as the police-patrol mechanism 
(direct monitoring by the principals) and fire alarm (monitoring by third parties on behalf 
of the principals) (ibid.: p.28). Agents are therefore not entirely free to act as they please, 
but they have to act within the confines placed upon them by their masters (Cini 1999: 
p.6; Pollack 1997: pp.5).  
Third, an agent can have autonomy, which is seen as a necessary pre-condition for 
influence (Cini 1999: p.8). There are different ways of defining autonomy. This thesis 
draws on the definition of autonomy as a range of potential independent action available 
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to the agent (Hawkins et al. 2006: p.8) and as the agent’s ability to introduce new policies 
or establish new agendas (Conceição-Heldt 2013: p.24).  
The fourth concept is closely related to autonomy. Discretion means that the principals 
define certain goals and expectations they have towards their agent, but not exactly which 
measures the agent has to take to achieve these goals. The agent is hence left with a 
certain degree of freedom to decide what kinds of actions to take (Hawkins et al. 2006: 
p.8).  
In the principal-agent literature, there are several different assumptions about the 
Commission as an agent this thesis draws on. The first one concerns the Commission’s 
preferences. The European Commission is in general assumed to be a pro-European 
actor in favour of more integration (Bailer 2014: p.41); i.e. of increasing tasks and 
competences for the European Union level within a given policy field, as well as of 
extending EU competences to new policy areas. It is also in favour of increasing its own 
competences and the influence it has on the policy process (Pollack 1994: p.102). 
Moreover, it is assumed that it - as a rational actor - has an own agenda, that it acts 
strategically to attain its own preferences and that it takes into account how others may 
react to its own actions (Tallberg 2003: p.16).  
Another assumption regarding the Commission underlying this thesis concerns the 
stability of Commission preferences. These are expected to be stable over time, 
regardless of shifting Commissioners and Commission staff. This can be assumed as the 
Commission has more continuity and a longer time horizon than Member State 
governments, as Commission staff stay in office longer than national government 
representatives (Conceição-Heldt 2011: p.405).  
 
 
5.2.  Agent strategies 
Most scholars applying the principal-agent approach have focused on principals, why 
they delegate and how they control the agent (Hawkins/Jacoby 2006: p.199). Far less has 
been written on what kind of possibilities to act the agent has and which strategies it can 
apply. There are, however, a number of contributions in the relevant literature this thesis 
draws on in order to identify the strategies the European Commission applied in the case 
of the CCCTB. This section first explains what a strategy is, before outlining those found 
in the relevant principal-agent literature.  
As outlined above, agents are actors who have their own preferences and pursue their 
own interests (Pollack 1997: p.5). In principal-agent terms, they aim at maximising the 
attainment of their preferences (Tallberg 2003: p.16). In order to achieve their preferred 
results, agents apply strategies (Conceição-Heldt 2011: p.404). Thus, strategies are used 
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by agents to attain their preferences in order to achieve an outcome that corresponds to 
those preferences, to the greatest extent possible. Principals may be aware of these 
strategies and they can react to them with counter-strategies (Hawkins/Jacoby 2006: 
p.226).  
Turning to the strategies themselves, the following ones have been identified from the 
relevant principal-agent literature focusing on agent behaviour. Interpretation and 
reinterpretation of the mandate given to it by the principals is the first one. This is 
possible as no rules are as precise as they do not leave room for interpretation. While 
interpretation is used by the agent before delegation, reinterpretation follows delegation. 
Moreover, ‘older’, more established agents are more likely to openly reinterpret rules and 
mandates (ibid.: pp.206). Therefore, taking into account that the Commission is an 
established agent and only the time after the delegation of the mandate is considered, only 
reinterpreting is deemed relevant in this context. The agent uses reinterpretation in order 
to decide whether an issue lies within its mandate for action. It is an advantage for the 
agent in this respect when the mandate is rather vague (Conceição-Heldt 2011: p.413), as 
its autonomy increases in this case. Agents are, nonetheless, not completely free to 
reinterpret as they please, as they are still subject to certain limitations by the principals, 
and because they are concerned about their good reputation (Hawkins/Jacoby 2006: pp. 
206), since they want to be considered as credible and trustworthy actors.  
Shaming the principal is another strategy the agent can apply to attain its own 
preferences. From a principal-agent perspective, the agent uses shaming to embarrass 
principals and to create political pressure to coax them into action (Tallberg 2003: p.61).  
The principal-agent approach furthermore assumes that principals may have conflicting 
interests and that agents can make use of these (Pollack 1997: p.7). This may increase the 
agents’ freedom to decide what actions to take (Conceição-Heldt 2011: p.413). Applied 
to the European Union setting, it is expected that Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) is 
advantageous for the Commission, since it is easier to find coalition partners among 
Member States when QMV applies compared to situations requiring unanimity (Bailer 
2014: p.44). In unanimity situations, all Member States need to agree to a proposal for it 
to be adopted and it is therefore not possible for the Commission to make use of 
disagreements among them. Consequently, another Commission strategy is to strive for 
ways to circumvent the unanimity requirement.  
It is often argued in the literature drawing on the principal-agent approach that the 
European Commission can use the European Court of Justice for its own purposes 
(Schmidt 2000: p.37; Radaelli/Kramer 2008: p.331) and scholars point to the ECJ being a 
more independent agent than the Commission (Schmidt 2000: p.38; Tallberg 2000: 
p.846). It can thus make use of the ECJ’s higher degree of autonomy and use it to attain 
its own preferences, by threatening Member States with the ECJ and its case law. 
Member States are assumed to prefer political solutions to legal interpretations, as they 
have the possibility of shaping the latter while they do not have a direct influence on ECJ 
18 
 
rulings. What is more, no Member State wishes to have its tax legislation overturned and 
tax base undermined by ECJ case law in direct taxation (Radaelli/Kramer 2008: p.319). 
ECJ jurisprudence has increased to a considerable degree in the past couple of years and 
the ECJ has already ruled against Member States in tax issues several times (ibid.: p.322; 
Genschel/Jachtenfuchs 2009b: p.15). Threatening with the ECJ can thus be used by the 
agent to create a pressure to act on them.  
Due to informational asymmetries in favour of the agents, principals may set up 
monitoring mechanisms to reduce this informational advantage. However, the agent can 
also get active itself to escape from principal monitoring. One strategy applied for this 
purpose is the strategy of being an informative agent. As ‘informative actors’, agents 
provide the principals with information on their intentions and on the policy 
consequences of their actions, thereby proving to the principals that it is trustworthy 
(Thompson 2006: pp.234) and transparent. This is expected to increase credibility and the 
likelihood of the proposal being adopted in the end. 
Moreover, agents may open themselves to non-principal third parties in order to achieve 
their aims. This strategy is referred to as agent permeability (Hawkins/Jacoby 2006: 
p.208), which means that non-principal actors are granted access to agent decision-
making. While third actor participation in this process is often perceived as a control 
mechanism applied by principals to monitor the agent - the so-called “fire alarms” 
mechanism (Hawkins et al. 2006: p.28) -  Hawkins and Jacoby (2006: pp.208) argue that 
agents can decide themselves to open up for third party participation to receive 
information from them and to gain their support.  
The last strategy found in the literature is framing.
11
 Agents can use framing in order for a 
proposal or a result to appeal to their principals (Tallberg 2000: p.846). A frame can be 
defined as a “schemata of interpretation”, which includes a problem definition, a specific 
course of action and a preferred problem solution (Rhinard 2010: p.2). This term sounds 
quite abstract, but it basically means that a frame is used in order to shape our view of a 
certain topic and/or problem. Values and ideas play an important role when framing an 
issue. Frames help the agent to make the link between ideas and policy choices explicit 
and as the agent needs the support of principals in order to attain its preferences, it is 
important that the ideas and values underlying the frame are considered reasonable and 
justified by them (ibid.: pp.58). Strategic framing can especially be facilitated when there 
is a window of opportunity, i.e. an external event which may result in pressures for 
change and which thereby provides an opportunity for the agent to use new policy frames 
(ibid.: p.60; p.79). A window of opportunity in form of an external crisis can contribute to 
Member States being more receptive to Commission proposals (Pollack 1994: p.128).  
                                                          
11
 It should be noted that framing is not usually applied in the principal-agent framework and the 
assumptions about framing underlying this study are based on Mark Rhinard’s (2010) contribution; which 
does not in itself form part of the principal-agent approach. Nevertheless, since it has also been found in 
principal-agent literature that agents can use this strategy (Tallberg 2000: p.846), it is still considered 
relevant for the purposes of this thesis and is therefore adapted to this setting.  
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Table 1 briefly summarises the above considerations. It outlines the identified strategies, 
the questions that guided the analysis of the Commission documents and other empirical 
material, as well as the operationalisation of concepts and how the Commission is 
expected to benefit from the use of the respective strategies (i.e. the Commission’s 
intentions). 
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Table 1: Identified strategies, guiding questions and operationsalisation  
Identified strategy Guiding questions for the analysis Operationalisation What does the Commission intend 
to achieve with this?  
Reinterpreting the 
mandate 
Did the Commission reinterpret the 
mandate given to it by the principals (i.e. to 
ensure the functioning of the Internal 
Market) to push for the CCCTB? 
Use of the Internal Market as 
an argument for action in the 
area of direct taxation in 
general and for the CCCTB 
in particular 
Draw link between Internal Market 
and the Commission’s action in 
direct taxation in order to justify its 
own action in this area 
Shaming Member States Did the Commission use shaming to 
embarrass principals and pressure them to 
take action?  
Blame Member States for 
lack of progress in (direct) 
tax area 
Create pressure to act on Member 
States  
Advocating for QMV and 
enhanced cooperation 
Did the Commission attempt to increase the 
likelihood of being able to exploit differing 
principal preferences?  
Arguments for QMV and 
enhanced cooperation in the 
case of the CCCTB 
Aiming at circumventing unanimity 
requirement in order to exploit 
preference heterogeneity 
Threatening with the 
European Court of 
Justice 
Did the Commission use the ECJ as an 
argument when pushing for the CCCTB? 
Instances of threatening with 
the ECJ as an argument to 
push for CCCTB 
Convince Member States that active 
action is better than passive waiting 
Informative agent Did the Commission provide the principals 
with information on its intentions and 
policy consequences? 
Provision of information in 
special working groups; 
provision of information on 
what it does not intend to do 
Ensure Member States that it is a 
trustworthy and transparent agent 
Increasing permeability Did the Commission open up for non-
principal actors? 
Non-principal actor 
participation in CCCTB 
development process 
1) Draw on external actors’ 
information and insights  
2) Secure third actors’ support 
Framing Did the Commission use frames to render 
the CCCTB more attractive to principals?  
Evidence for a schemata of 
interpretation used in this 
case 
Clarify the link between widely 
accepted norms and the CCCTB 
proposal in order to make the 
proposal more attractive to the 
Member States  
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5.3.  Justification of the choice of theoretical underpinning  
 
There are several reasons why the principal-agent approach has been chosen as the most 
suitable theoretical framework for this analysis. First, the principal-agent approach does 
not categorically claim that one actor is more powerful than the other (Kassim/Manon 
2003: p.125) and thus, it provides a more balanced framework to understand the agent’s 
behaviour within the confines set by the principals. What is more, the principal-agent 
literature offers some valuable contributions on how the Commission acts as an agent. 
From a theoretical point of view it is moreover important to supplement the principal-
agent approach with further input on agents’ behaviour. So far, the approach has very 
much focused on principals, their decisions to delegate and their mechanisms to control 
the agent. However, as noted by Hawkins/Jacoby (2006: p.226), this focus may lead to a 
bias in the theory, as agent strategies are decisive to understand the degree of the agents’ 
autonomy. Therefore, analysing what kinds of strategies are applied and how they are 
applied by the agent may enrich the principal-agent approach. Moreover, laying out 
which strategies the Commission uses in the area of taxation is a necessary first step for 
further analysis of, for example, how successful they are (ibid.: p.227). 
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6. Application of the theory to the CCCTB case  
 
This chapter applies the core theoretical concepts outlined above to the CCCTB case. The 
first section briefly sketches the development and content of the proposal, followed by 
the actual application of the theory to the CCCTB.
12
 All these steps are necessary in order 
to provide a basic understanding of the area and the actors’ positions on it. 
 
 
6.1. The CCCTB as a case 
The origins and ideas of the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base already date 
back to 1999, when the Commission was asked by the Member States in the Council to 
examine solutions for company tax problems businesses face when operating across EU 
borders in more than one Member State. On this basis, the Commission considered the 
CCCTB as the most appropriate solution (Curzon Price 2011). The proposal on a Council 
Directive for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base was nevertheless first issued 
by the Commission in March 2011 (Rautenstrauch 2011: p.8). It has already been 
discussed in the Council (Loyens&Loeff 2012: pp.1), however, more than three years 
after it was issued, it is still pending and the Commission is expected to issue a revised 
proposal in 2014 (Euractiv 2013).
13
 
This proposal primarily addresses large, multinational companies operating in more than 
one EU Member State (Curzon Price 2011). The problem these kinds of companies 
experience today is that they are taxed according to the respective national rules and rates 
and have to file several tax returns regardless of the fact that they actually are part of one 
company group. This is considered to increase compliance costs for businesses 
(Aujean/von Frenckell 2011). 
Moreover, the parent company and the subsidiaries
14
 of the group cannot offset their 
respective profits and losses against each other for tax purposes (Curzon Price 2011). In 
order to illustrate why this aspect is problematic, a very simplified example is given. A 
fictive company has its main establishment in one EU Member State and two subsidiaries 
in two other Member States. One of the subsidiaries is in economic troubles and as a 
consequence of that endures losses in a given tax year. The parent company in Member 
State 1 and the subsidiary in Member State 2 are however performing very well in the 
same tax year, which means that their taxable income is high and consequently also the 
                                                          
12 
It should be noted that the focus is on the political aspects and that technicalities regarding the content 
of the proposal are only explained when this is important for understanding the argument. 
13
 To the author’s knowledge, this has not yet been the case at the time of writing (May 2014).  
14
 A subsidiary is a business company owned or controlled by a larger company.  
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amount of taxes they have to pay based on this income. Nevertheless, because of the poor 
performance of the second subsidiary, the group as a whole is dragged down 
economically. If the group was able to offset the losses from the second subsidiary 
against the profits of the parent company and the first subsidiary, its taxable income 
would be lower and hence also the taxes paid on it. In the current situation, there is no 
EU-wide possibility to offset losses and profits against each other.
15
 
The proposal brought forward by the Commission intends to remedy some of the issues 
outlined above. It would allow companies to calculate their tax base on a common set of 
rules, which would be the same in all Member States. Companies would furthermore be 
able to offset losses and profits against each other across parts of the companies 
established in different Member States (Aujean/von Frenckell 2011).  
The tax rates of the Member States would not be harmonised (European Commission 
2011a: p.5), i.e. each Member State would still be able to set the corporate tax rates they 
consider most appropriate. From the single tax base which would be calculated for the 
whole group, a share of the tax base would be apportioned among the relevant Member 
States, depending on where in the European Union the parts of the group are established. 
The respective shares would then be taxed based on the tax rate applicable in the different 
Member States (Aujean/von Frenckell 2011).  
 
 
6.2. Application of the principal-agent approach to the CCCTB case 
How can the core concepts of the principal-agent approach be applied to the CCCTB 
case? In this thesis, the collective principal is conceptualised as the Member States 
represented by national governments, parliaments, the Council and the European Council, 
while the agent is the European Commission, represented by DG Taxation and Customs 
Union (DG TAXUD). The principals delegated authority to the Commission, 
empowering it to act on behalf of them.  
The mandate given to the European Commission for European Union action in the case 
of tax policy can be derived from the task to ensure the functioning of the Internal 
Market. The establishment of the Internal Market has been one of the key objectives of 
the European Union and it dates back until its very beginning, to the Treaty establishing 
the European Economic Community (EEC), which entered into force in 1958 (Chalmers 
et al. 2011: p.12). The Commission as the “guardian of the treaties” (Tallberg 2003: p.3) 
is thus responsible for ensuring that this task is fulfilled. In the area of direct taxation, 
Article 115 TFEU provides for the Commission to propose measures and thus allows EU 
                                                          
15
 Only very few EU Member States (e.g. Denmark) allow cross-border loss-compensation between 
parent companies and their subsidiaries established in other Member States (Koerver 
Schmidt/Bundgaard 2011: p.43).  
24 
 
intervention by approximating national tax laws which create barriers to the 
establishment and functioning of the Internal Market (Genschel/Jachtenfuchs 2009a: 
p.12). In 1999, the Member States gave the Commission the concrete mandate to 
investigate the impact of different company tax levels on where companies settle in the 
EU, whether the current tax provisions provide obstacles to economic activity in the 
Internal Market and, if this was the case, potential remedies to this. On this basis, the 
Commission outlined its strategy for company taxation.
16
 This mandate is quite a broad 
one, as the Member States did not define any concrete measures which needed to be 
taken, which provided the Commission with a considerable extent of discretion as regards 
the identification of solutions to possible Internal Market distortions.  
Autonomy has earlier been defined as independent action at the disposal of the agent to 
attain its own preferences and/or to introduce new agendas. Out of a variety of different 
options to solve problems related to the functioning of the Internal Market (Home State 
Taxation,
17
 a European Corporate Income Tax,
18
 complete harmonisation of national tax 
rules, CCCTB), the Commission was able to advocate and work on a proposal for the 
solution it considered most suited, namely the CCCTB (European Commission 2001b: 
p.14). This autonomy was, however, confined by the Member States and the Commission 
can be expected to only push for solutions which have a chance of getting passed by the 
Council. Thus, the European Commission is not expected to propose an ‘extreme’ option 
which would not have a realistic chance of being adopted (Bailer 2014: p.42) by at least 
some of the Member States and it needs to strategically shape the proposal in order to 
make sure that it is acceptable to them (Tallberg 2000: pp.848).  
The following assumptions can be drawn from the theoretical underpinning on the nature 
of the Commission as an agent and the Member States as the collective principal and their 
respective preferences in taxation. Despite the Member States not being the focus of this 
analysis, it is nevertheless important to outline their preferences as well, as this enables a 
more thorough understanding of how the collective principal may react to the strategies 
applied by the Commission and how the Commission in turn reacts to them.  
In-line with the principal-agent approach, the European Commission is conceptualised as 
a unitary actor (Kassim/Menon 2003: p.133). This means that the actions of all of its units 
                                                          
16
 The 2001 study Company Taxation in the Internal Market (European Commission 2001b) and the 
supplementing Communication Towards an Internal Market without tax obstacles responded to this 
Council mandate (European Commission 2001c: p.3), outlining the Commission strategy in this policy 
area. 
17
 The Home State Taxation approach was another option discussed. Under this scheme, the tax base 
would be computed according to the national rules applicable in the company’s home state (i.e. the state 
where the headquarter is located) (European Commission 2001b: p.14), regardless of where the 
company is active within the EU.  
18
 This scheme was another option discussed. It would allow for a tax to be levied at the EU level and a 
share of the revenue could go to the EU (ibid.).  
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(the Directorates-General,
19
 the Commissioner, the Cabinet
20
) are considered as actions 
on behalf of the Commission as a whole. The relevant Directorate-General (DG Taxation 
and Customs Union – DG TAXUD), as well as the respective Commissioner responsible 
for this issue area
21
 and his cabinet represent the Commission in tax policy and are 
therefore subject to analysis. Regarding the Commission’s preferences, it is in general 
assumed that it is an actor in favour of more European integration (Bailer 2014: p.41). 
Applied to tax policy this means that the Commission can be expected to have a 
preference for expanding legislation to direct taxation by proposing the CCCTB, since 
this is an area where EU competences
22
 are rather weak. Moreover, it is expected to be in 
favour of increasing its own competences and the influence it has on the policy process 
(Pollack 1994: p.102); thus also in the area of direct taxation.  
Drawing on the principal-agent approach, the Member States are assumed to prefer 
keeping sovereignty at the national level (Pollack 1994: p.103). It is therefore expected 
that they only very reluctantly agree to give up competences in the sensitive issue area of 
taxation, which means that they only consent to a transfer of competences to the 
European level when they can expect considerable benefits (e.g. an increase in 
investments, growth in jobs, easing monitoring for national tax administrations) and that 
they oppose the proposal when they anticipate losses (e.g. an increase in costs for 
administering the tax systems, a loss in tax revenue, etc.).  
Contrary to the Commission, the Member States are not considered as a unitary actor; 
they are rather viewed as a heterogeneous, collective principal. A collective principal is 
an actor constituted of several different units (the Member States in this design) who 
collectively delegate a mandate to the agent (the Commission). This does, however, not 
mean that they agree on all matters. Quite on the contrary, their positions on specific 
policy issues can differ to a considerable degree, a fact which can be exploited by the 
agent (Pollack 1997: p.7). In the case of the CCCTB, the individual Member States also 
had very different positions on the proposal. An overview on Member States’ positions 
can be found in Table 3 in Annex B.  
The proposal met significant resistance on behalf of a considerable number of Member 
States after it was adopted by the European Commission. Some were in favour of the 
proposal, while the national parliaments of Bulgaria, Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Romania, Sweden and the UK objected to it by issuing reasoned opinions, which 
                                                          
19
 There are currently around 33 individual departments or Directorates-General (DG), which all cover a 
specific issue area. They all fall under the responsibility of (at least) one Commissioner and their main 
tasks correspond to those of national ministries (Chalmers et al. 2011: p.57). 
20
 The Cabinets provide a link between the individual Commissioners and the corresponding DGs. Each 
Cabinet is the office of the Commissioner. They are mainly responsible for preparing the weekly 
College of Commissioners meetings and for providing information to the respective Commissioner they 
are working for (ibid.: p.58). 
21
 At the point of writing (May 2014), the responsible Commissioner for Taxation, Customs, Statistics, 
Audit and Anti-Fraud is Algirdas Šemeta.  
22
 In the following, EU and Community competences are used synonymously.  
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means that they raised doubts regarding the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.
23
 However, the number of reasoned opinions was not enough to initiate 
the so-called yellow-card procedure, which forces the Commission to re-examine the 
proposal in order to decide whether it should be maintained, amended or withdrawn 
(Vascega/van Thiel 2012: p.15). Apart from these concerns, some Member States feared 
a decrease in tax revenues, a loss of national sovereignty, as well as increased costs of 
administering the tax system (Pearse Trust 2011).  
 
 
  
                                                          
23
 The principle of subsidiarity means that the EU can only legislate when the aims of a measure cannot 
be reached by the Member States unilaterally and when they can better be reached by EU action 
(Chalmers et al. 2011: p.129). The principle of proportionality lays down that EU action shall not go 
beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the objectives of the Treaties (ibid.: p.367). 
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7. Empirical analysis 
 
This chapter presents the results of the analysis, drawing together the assumptions from 
the theoretical underpinning with the findings from the empirical world.  
As outlined in the previous chapters, taxation is an important issue area as it directly 
touches upon the nation states’ sovereignty and therefore, it is important to examine what 
kind of strategies the supranational actor European Commission – an actor who initiates 
legislation and holds considerable powers - applies in this highly sensitive area. In order 
to examine this question, a case study approach has been chosen, as this allows for an in-
depth analysis of the strategies. The Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB) proposal has been selected as a suitable case to illustrate what kind of 
strategies the European Commission applies in the area of taxation, since it represents a 
crucial case where Commission strategies should be particularly evident. The strategies 
have been identified from the relevant theoretic literature on the principal-agent approach 
and this chapter provides empirical evidence for them.  
During the course of the analysis, three phases in the development of the CCCTB 
proposal have been identified: an initial phase, a mid-phase where consultations between 
the Commission, Member States and relevant stakeholders took place, as well as a phase 
after the proposal was issued. The strategies are presented along the lines of these three 
phases. The analysis has moreover found that the Commission predominately used some 
of the strategies in each of these phases. It should, however, be noted that it is not 
possible to strictly divide them from each other, as they overlap and the Commission to a 
certain extent applied some of these strategies in more than one phase. In order to 
facilitate the understanding, each Commission strategy below is introduced by a figure 
outlining its main intention and aim. 
 
 
7.1. Initial phase: from the mandate to the CCCTB (2001-2004) 
The initial phase of the proposal reaches from the Commission’s 2001 communication 
“Tax policy in the European Union – Priorities for the years ahead”, in which it inter alia 
outlines its priorities in the field of company taxation, to the establishment of the first 
CCCTB Working Group
24
 in the end of 2004. The strategies applied in this phase are 
reinterpretation of the mandate, shaming Member States, advocating for QMV and 
enhanced cooperation and threatening with the European Court of Justice.  
                                                          
24
 As outlined further below, the CCCTB Working Group was a forum where Member State 
representatives and Commission representatives met to discuss about technical questions regarding the 
CCCTB. 
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7.1.1. Reinterpreting the mandate 
Figure 1: Reinterpreting the mandate: Commission strategy, intention and aim 
 
 
According to Hawkins/Jacoby (2006: pp.206), no delegation is as precise as it does not 
leave room for interpretation. This can be used by agents, since they themselves can 
decide to a certain extent whether issues fall within their mandate or not. As outlined in 
previous sections, Member States have been reluctant to delegate authority to a 
supranational institution in the sensitive area of taxation in general and in direct taxation 
in particular and there is no direct legal basis for the Commission to legislate in this field. 
The mandate to propose legislation in direct taxation is derived from the Commission’s 
mandate to ensure the establishment and functioning of the Internal Market. More 
specifically and applied to the CCCTB case, the mandate given to the Commission by the 
Member States represented in the Council was to show what kind of obstacles there are in 
the area of direct taxation and to present some solutions to these. However, there was no 
direct mandate to propose the CCCTB as such. It is therefore argued that the European 
Commission used reinterpretation to attain its own preferences, namely the expansion of 
Community and Commission competences, when pushing for the CCCTB.  
The European Commission used the broad mandate to ensure the functioning of the 
Internal Market in order to draft legislation in the area of direct taxation. In the 
explanatory memorandum preceding the actual proposal, the Commission outlines that:  
The Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base aims to tackle some major fiscal impediments to 
growth in the Single Market. In the absence of common corporate tax rules, the interaction of 
national systems often leads to over-taxation and double-taxation, businesses are facing heavy 
administrative burdens and high tax compliance costs. […] The CCCTB is an important initiative 
on the path towards removing obstacles to the completion of the Single Market […] (European 
Commission 2011a: p.4).    
How did the Commission use the Internal Market argument to justify the CCCTB, a 
rather wide-reaching proposal for which it had not received a direct mandate from the 
Member States? Three steps of using the Internal Market argument have been identified 
in the course of the analysis. First, the Commission aimed at showing the link between 
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the Internal Market and tax policy, and direct taxation in particular. The Commission did 
this in order to justify its action in an area where it only has a rather vague mandate for 
action. It did so inter alia by declaring that “the contribution of tax policy to Community 
objectives has increasingly been linked to the development of the Internal Market” 
(European Commission 2001a: p.3). It furthermore stated very clearly that it found it 
“unacceptable” (ibid.: p.9) that there were still obstacles to the completion and 
functioning of the Internal Market, one of the main objectives of the EU. According to 
the Commission, this especially applies to the field of direct taxation, since some 
achievements have been made in indirect taxation so far, while there is still no coherent 
policy in direct taxation (ibid.: p.3).  
Second, having justified the link between EU action in direct taxation and the Internal 
Market, the Commission aimed at outlining how the variety of tax systems in the EU 
hamper its functioning and what effects this has on EU businesses and national 
administrations. As the Commission argued, the current corporate tax arrangements 
provide for a number of obstacles to cross-border activities, which in turn impede the 
functioning of the Internal Market and its potentials (European Commission 2001b: p.9). 
This has a negative effect on companies involved in cross-border activities, as well as on 
the Member States’ national authorities. Since the establishment of the Internal Market, 
European businesses trading cross-border have considered themselves more European 
than national and they increasingly operate in more than one Member State (European 
Commission 2001a: p.6; 2001c: p.5). However, this perception of the whole EU as their 
home market is, according to the Commission, not reflected by the current tax 
arrangements they meet in the Internal Market (European Commission 2001b: p.2), as 
they are confronted with currently 28
25
 different tax systems. Among the negative 
consequences connected to this are for example a risk of double taxation of these 
companies, high compliance costs and discrimination due to overly complicated 
administrative procedures and delays in tax refunds (European Commission 2001a: p.16). 
All these, as argued by this actor, are factors which may discourage companies to engage 
in cross-border activities and thus significantly limit the potentials of the Internal Market 
as originally intended (European Commission 2005a: p.4). However, it is not only 
European businesses who suffer from hassles associated with the current arrangements, 
also the costs incurred by national tax administrations of administering the current system 
are considerable (European Commission 2001b: p.16; 2001c: p.17).  
In a third step of reinterpretation, it was described how the CCCTB fits into this picture. 
As argued by the Commission, a comprehensive approach such as the CCCTB would 
provide a remedy to many of the problems outlined above and thus contribute to the 
success of the Internal Market as a whole (European Commission 2001b: p.14). It would 
furthermore help to reduce compliance costs for businesses, allow for offsetting losses 
and profits within the EU, help to avoid double taxation and reduce discriminatory 
                                                          
25
 The number of Member States has gradually increased during the time frame of the analysis. While 
there were 15 Member States in 2001, this number increased to 25 in 2004, 27 in 2007, and 28 in 2013.  
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situations businesses face when operating within the EU (European Commission 2001c: 
p.16). Moreover, the CCCTB would, according to the Commission, also solve some of 
the problems national tax administrations encounter by rendering tax audits and controls 
more efficient through improved cooperation between Member States (European 
Commission 2001c: pp.17). This would lead to fewer possibilities for companies to 
exploit inconsistencies between the different company tax systems in the EU (European 
Commission 2011a: p.6).  
As outlined above, when arguing for the CCCTB, the Commission aimed at drawing a 
clear link between the Internal Market and its own actions in the direct tax area. It 
furthermore outlined how the system of currently 28 different corporate tax provisions 
provides obstacles for the Internal Market and disadvantages for businesses and Member 
States and how these problems could be remedied by introducing the CCCTB. The 
original mandate of the principals (‘Ensure the establishment and functioning of the 
Internal Market’) and the rather broad mandate to outline current obstacles and potential 
remedies in the field of direct taxation have thus been reinterpreted by the Commission to 
advocate for the CCCTB.  
 
 
7.1.2. Shaming Member States 
Figure 2: Shaming Member States: Commission strategy, intention and aim 
 
 
As outlined in the theory section, agents can use shaming to embarrass principals and 
pressure them to action (Tallberg 2003: p.61). Applied to the CCCTB case, the 
Commission used this strategy to inform the public and interested stakeholders of whom 
it blamed for the minimal progress made in the area of company taxation. In the 
Commission’s view, too little has happened in this area, “and Member States essentially 
operate the same company tax systems as they did before the set-up of the Internal 
Market” (European Commission 2001c: p.3). It furthermore noted that there was a 
mismatch between the status quo in taxation and the economic development, which 
urgently needed to be addressed, especially in light of the looming enlargement (ibid.). 
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The Commission considered the Member States and their lack of political will 
responsible for the slow progress in company taxation (European Commission 2004: p.1).  
Faced with this slow development, there have been discussions to set up a new body in 
the framework of the Council to co-ordinate tax issues (European Commission 2001a: 
pp.20). From a principal-agent perspective, this can be seen as a severe threat, since 
principals would take competences in the area of taxation back to themselves and away 
from the agent. As a consequence, the Commission vehemently protested against this 
threat by stating that: 
[I]t is the insufficient political will combined with the unanimity requirement rather than the 
existence of one body or another that are the main obstacles to progress. Any proposal of this 
nature [to set up a new body in the framework of the Council, T.L.] should therefore respect the 
institutional structure and methods of the Community. (European Commission 2001a: p.21).  
As can be seen from the above statement, the European Commission reacted to the threat 
of withdrawing competences in the area of taxation by shaming Member States in return; 
claiming that it did not matter whether there was a new body or not, as long as the 
political will to implement reforms was missing.  
The Commission thus used shaming as a strategy to embarrass Member States and 
pressure them into action and as a counter-strategy following the plan to create a new 
body dealing with tax issues in the framework of the Council.   
 
 
7.1.3. Advocating for QMV and enhanced cooperation 
Figure 3: Advocating for QMV and enhanced cooperation: Commission strategy, intention and aim 
 
 
As outlined in the theory chapter, it is advantageous for the Commission when it is able 
to make use of differing preferences among the principals. Qualified Majority Voting 
(QMV) in the area of company taxation and enhanced cooperation in the CCCTB 
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proposal would open the possibility for exploiting differing preferences. The unanimity 
requirement in place today makes decision-making extremely cumbersome and leaves 
little possibility for the Commission to push for proposals, as reaching consensus among 
at present 28 Member States in a sensitive area such as corporate taxation is very 
difficult. It is argued in the following section that the Commission tried to advocate for 
QMV in the area of corporate taxation and to propose enhanced cooperation for the 
CCCTB proposal in order to ensure that not all Member States need to reach an 
agreement, thus facilitating the adoption of the proposal. 
The Commission has been trying to lobby for extending QMV to decision-making in 
taxation in general and in direct taxation in particular for some time. Already at the 
Intergovernmental Conference on the Constitutional Treaty from 2003 to 2004, the 
European Commission strongly advocated for introducing QMV in taxation (European 
Commission 2014c). In the Commission’s view, Qualified Majority Voting in the direct 
tax area is necessary in order to ensure the modernisation and simplification of 
Community measures, inter alia relating to the tax base for companies (European 
Commission n.d.a: p.4). Moreover, it would be easier to reduce tax barriers preventing 
the proper functioning of the Internal Market, as unanimity could lead to political 
standstill in this area (European Commission n.d.b: p.1), taking especially the (at that 
point in time) upcoming enlargement of 2004 into account. Thus, the CCCTB should 
ideally be decided upon by QMV (European Commission 2003: p.5). However, 
unanimity still seems to be more realistic in the future, as, in the Commission’s own 
words, “[a] handful of Member States dug their heels in, ensuring that unanimity remains 
the rule for tax-related issues […]” (European Commission n.d.b: p.1).  
Faced with Member States’ unwillingness to give up unanimity in the tax field, the 
Commission had to find another way of ensuring that not all Member States have to agree 
in order for a proposal to be passed. The instrument of enhanced cooperation was 
considered to be a last resort approach to solve this problem (European Commission 
2004: p.4). Article 20 of the Treaty on European Union provides for enhanced 
cooperation, if at least nine Member States are willing to participate and the measure is 
unlikely to be adopted in the Union as a whole within a reasonable time period. As stated 
by the Commission, the CCCTB could be designed in a way that not all Member States 
would have to adopt it (European Commission 2001b: p.15; 2001c: p.17; 2003: p.26). 
Since support for the CCCTB proposal is far from assured (Rautenstrauch 2012: p.9), 
enhanced cooperation could be a way to overcome the unanimity requirement and thus a 
way of circumventing resistant Member States. The Commission could thereby exploit 
differing Member State preferences and still have the CCCTB proposal adopted, albeit 
only in a limited number of Member States.  
The inclusion of delegated and implementing acts (so-called post-legislative acts) in the 
CCCTB proposal represents another Commission attempt to circumvent the unanimity 
requirement for at least some elements of legislation and at the same time to increase its 
own competences in the area of direct taxation. In the following, both aspects are 
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described, it is outlined why they are quite controversial in this policy area and how the 
Commission as an agent could make use of them for its own purposes.  
Delegated acts have been introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon (Vascega/van Thiel 2012: 
p.18). Article 290 TFEU provides for the delegation of quasi-legislative powers to the 
Commission, which enables it to adopt or amend certain ‘non-essential’ elements of the 
legislative act. The Council may revoke the delegation or object to the act by qualified 
majority (ibid.). In the CCCTB proposal, delegated acts are referred to in several 
articles
26
 and they can be used by the Commission for amending Annexes I, II and III of 
the Directive,
27
 for the establishment of rules on aspects related to depreciation
28
 and for 
deciding upon more precise categories of fixed assets
29
 (ibid.).  
Implementing acts under comitology refer to the delegation of implementing powers to 
the European Commission. Comitology is the procedure allowing it to adopt legally 
binding measures under supervision of a committee consisting of representatives of 
national governments (Chalmers et al. 2011: p.117). Article 131 (2) of the CCCTB 
proposal refers to the examination procedure.
30
 This procedure provides for that an 
implementing act can only be adopted by the Commission when the committee supports 
it by qualified majority. In the CCCTB proposal, this refers to four Articles on the 
establishment of company forms of third countries,
31
 rules on the calculation of factors in 
the formula for apportionment of the tax base to the various Member States,
32
 the 
standard form of the notice to opt into the CCCTB system
33
, as well as rules on electronic 
filing, tax return and supporting documentation
34
 (Vascega/van Thiel 2012: p.17). As 
provided for by the Commission in the CCCTB proposal, it would be able to adopt 
measures on all these elements, under scrutiny of the examination procedure.  
These two procedures are controversial in the area of direct taxation, as they circumvent 
the unanimity requirement by replacing it with qualified majority for certain aspects of 
the proposed directive (Vascega/van Thiel 2011: 154). In the case of delegated acts, 
Member States can only object to the act by qualified majority, while an implementing 
act can be adopted when the committee supports it by qualified majority. In both cases, 
the unanimity requirement which is normally applicable in taxation is undermined, 
thereby removing veto power from the Member States (Vascega/van Thiel 2012: p.18).  
                                                          
26
 Articles 127-129 CCCTB Directive proposal. 
27
 Articles 2 (3) and 14 (3) CCCTB Directive proposal. 
28
 Article 34(5) CCCTB Directive proposal. 
29
 Article 42 CCCTB Directive proposal. 
30
 This Article refers to Article 5 of the new Regulation laying down the comitology procedure 
(Regulation 182/2011), which outlines the examination procedure.  
31
 Article 3 of the CCCTB Directive proposal. 
32
 Article 97 CCCTB Directive proposal. 
33
 Article 106 CCCTB Directive proposal. 
34
 Article 113 CCCTB Directive proposal. 
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Consequently, Member States have been very reluctant to accept these two procedures in 
direct taxation. Indeed, comitology has rarely been used in this area so far
35
 and some 
Member States have made it very clear that even a very limited use of comitology should 
be exceptional.
36
 Member State representatives have also expressed concern regarding 
comitology and its compatibility with national constitutions in the CCCTB Working 
Group (European Commission 2007b: para. 2).  
From a principal-agent perspective it can be argued that the Commission deliberately 
decided to include delegated and implementing acts in order to attain its preferences in 
the field of direct taxation. Both acts would provide the Commission with quasi-
legislative and implementing powers in a field where its competences in general, and 
especially compared to other policy areas, are rather limited. Second, as it is also assumed 
that the Commission would like to stretch and increase Community powers to areas 
where the EU-level is rather weak, both delegated and implementing acts would help it to 
do so. The qualified majority requirement applicable to both acts would render it possible 
to circumvent Member States’ veto power and resulting political deadlock, and it would 
be easier to adopt measures in this area. 
To summarise, the European Commission as an agent aimed at circumventing the 
requirement of unanimity by advocating for QMV and enhanced cooperation. Moreover, 
it included implementing and delegated acts in the proposal, despite the fact that many 
Member States oppose these procedures in direct taxation.  
 
  
                                                          
35
 Directives 2010/24/EU (Recovery Directive) and Directive 2011/16/EU (Directive on Administrative 
Cooperation in the field of Taxation and repealing Directive 77/799/EEC) also provided for a very 
limited use of the comitology procedure (Vascega/van Thiel 2011: p.154).  
36
 Bulgaria, Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal and the United Kingdom attached a 
statement to the Minutes of the Council regarding the inclusion of the comitology procedure in 
Directive 2011/16/EU on Administrative Coooperation in the field of Taxation stating that their 
“agreement to the limited use of comitology in this instance is an exceptional measure and should in no 
way be seen as setting a precedent for the use of comitology in the field of Taxation” (Council 
Document 5846/11 ADD 1 FISC 9, p.1).  
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7.1.4. Threatening with the European Court of Justice 
Figure 4: Threatening with the ECJ: Commission strategy, intention and aim 
 
 
Threatening with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is another strategy identified in the 
literature. In the case of the CCCTB, the Commission used the European Court of Justice 
in three ways. First, it threatened Member States with interpretation by the ECJ through 
its rulings and resulting case law; second, it threatened them with the prospect that 
interpretation by the ECJ is insufficient for solving the problems the currently 28 
different tax systems pose to the functioning of the Internal Market; and third, it 
threatened to initiate and pursue more infringement proceedings against Member States 
who violate EU law in the area of direct taxation.  
As regards the first point, the Commission openly warned the Member States of the 
consequences of ECJ interpretation in the absence of political action: 
[I]t is important to note that in the absence of political solutions taxpayers have been compelled to 
have recourse to the legal process to overcome discriminatory rules and other obstacles. In 
consequence, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has developed a large body of case law on the 
compatibility of national tax rules with the Treaty (European Commission 2001b: p.11).  
The European Commission called on the Member States to actively decide on political 
actions by introducing the CCCTB instead of passively waiting and risking that their tax 
laws are declared unlawful by the European Court of Justice (European Commission 
2004: p.1).  
It moreover warned the Member States that ECJ rulings may not be sufficient to solve the 
problems that are created by the inconsistencies of so many different tax systems within 
the European Union: 
While the ECJ has made a significant contribution to the removal of tax obstacles for companies, it 
is unlikely that the interpretation of the Treaty is sufficient to address all tax obstacles to cross-
border activity. Moreover, ECJ rulings are confined to the particular case put to it and may 
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therefore relate solely to individual aspects of a more general issue […] (European Commission 
2001b: pp.11). 
Therefore, the Commission considered a comprehensive political approach at EU level 
more appropriate in the area of direct taxation than mere legal interpretation alone. 
According to this actor, case law has some obvious limitations, as it is very time-
consuming and expensive, based on individual cases only, and as it does not provide 
generally applicable solutions; which results in legal uncertainty regarding its 
interpretation. Consequently, it advocated for legislative solutions (European 
Commission 2011b: p.61).  
The third identified way how the Commission made use of the Court of Justice is 
threatening with more infringement proceedings in the area of company taxation if no 
political action is taken by the Member States. The European Commission drew on its 
role as the guardian of the Treaty in this respect (European Commission 2001a: p.21). In 
this function, it can bring Member States before the Court of Justice in infringement 
proceedings (Blom-Hansen 2005: p.636). Indeed, the Commission clearly stated that it 
was not willing to accept that Member States infringe EU law in the tax field (European 
Commission 2001a: p.21). In the Commission’s own words:  
[T]he Commission now intends to adopt a more pro-active strategy generally in the field of tax 
infringements and be more ready to initiate action where it believes that Community law is being 
broken. […] There is a particular imperative in the direct tax field: the current approach of leaving 
the development of case law in the area of direct taxation to chance by simply reacting to cases 
taken by taxpayers to the ECJ is not a proper basis for progress towards agreed Community 
objectives (European Commission 2001a: p.22). 
As outlined above, the Commission actively pursued the strategy of threatening with case 
law out of direct control and influence by the Member States. Moreover, it pointed to the 
insufficiency of ECJ rulings in direct taxation and the Commission’s own more active 
role in pursuing proceedings against Member States’ infringements of Internal Market 
provisions in the direct tax field in order to convince the principals that the proposed 
CCCTB would provide a more comprehensive solution.  
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7.2. The consultative phase: consulting Member States and third actors (2004-2011) 
This phase encompasses the time from the first CCCTB Working Group in the end of 
2004 until the proposal was issued in 2011. However, as can be seen from the analysis, 
parts of the strategies outlined below have been applied throughout the whole process. 
The strategies predominately used are the informative agent and the increasing 
permeability strategy.  
 
 
7.2.1. Informative agent  
Figure 5: Informative agent: Commission strategy, intention and aim 
 
 
As an informative agent, the Commission provides its principals with information on its 
intentions and on the policy consequences of its actions. This decreases the informational 
asymmetry between them, and thus the Commission can prove that its intentions are 
honest and that it can be trusted. Applied to the CCCTB, the Commission informed the 
principals about its intentions by including them in the decision-making process when 
drafting the CCCTB proposal and by stressing what it did not intend to do. As regards the 
second point (information about the policy consequences of its actions), the Commission 
mainly used reports and impact assessments to inform the principals about the 
consequences of the CCCTB.  
From a principal-agent perspective, the agent involves principals in the decision-making 
process in order to decrease the principals’ incentives to control it (Delreux/Kerremans 
2010: p.364), to reduce its own informational advantage by giving Member States the 
possibility to get an insight into the policy formulation process, and to ensure that they 
can express their own preferences towards the Commission (Tallberg 2000: p.847). 
Applied to the CCCTB case, the Commission actively involved the principals by 
initiating the so-called CCCTB Working Group, where representatives of the Member 
States and the Commission participated in. The main official purpose of the CCCTB 
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Working Group was, according to the Commission, to provide it with technical assistance 
and advice. Meetings were held around four times a year, from the end of 2004 to 2008 
(European Commission 2014d). Faced with political standstill and lack of progress on 
some important proposals in the area of company taxation which had been pending since 
the 1970s/1980s, the Commission aimed at changing its approach in the case of the 
CCCTB, by acknowledged that “all initiatives [in the area of company taxation, T.L.] 
should be defined through a consultative process with the Member States” (European 
Commission 2001c: p.4). Including them in the decision-making process thus became one 
of the most important principles of the Commission’s approach in company taxation 
(European Commission 2001b: p.17; 2001c: p.4). The alternative to this – an independent 
expert group not including Member States – was, according to the Commission, “unlikely 
to be successful and would risk resulting in a report outlining a possible common base 
which would simply be ignored” (European Commission 2004: p.4). Taking this risk into 
account, the Commission decided that it would be better to include the Member States.  
Throughout the whole process of consulting on and drafting the CCCTB, the Commission 
also informed the principals about what it did not intend to achieve with the proposed 
directive. It did neither intend to undermine the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, nor did it intend to impair the Member States’ rights to set the company 
tax rate they consider appropriate. Regarding subsidiarity, the Commission stated in the 
Exploratory Memorandum of the CCCTB proposal that the proposal complied with this 
principle, as a non-coordinated approach would not provide a relief to the tax-related 
problems companies currently face when trading cross-border within the EU. As 
individual Member State action would not achieve the appropriate results and a common 
approach is required on this issue, Community action was justified and the principle of 
subsidiarity respected (European Commission 2011a: pp.9; 2011b: pp.15). As far as the 
principle of proportionality is concerned, the Commission also argued that the CCCTB 
proposal provided both necessary and suitable means for achieving the desired objectives, 
i.e. that it is proportionate, as it would not force companies which do not engage in cross-
border transactions to participate in it and because the advantages of the CCCTB are 
expected to outweigh the initial additional costs Member State administrations are 
expected to bear when implementing the proposal (European Commission 2011a: p.10).  
Apart from stressing that the CCCTB proposal respected the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality, the Commission was also eager to emphasise that the proposal did 
not intend to harmonise the company tax rates and that each Member State would be able 
to set the tax rate it considered appropriate, even after the implementation of the CCCTB. 
Indeed, in almost every communication and paper the Commission has published on the 
CCCTB it is stressed several times that it does not intend to harmonise corporate tax rates 
(European Commission 2001a: pp.8; 2001b: p.15; 2004: pp.3; 2005a: p.5; 2006: p.4; 
2007a: pp.6-8; 2011a: pp.4, p.10; 2011b: p.17). As emphasised by Commissioner Šemeta 
in a speech given at a press conference in Brussels at the launch of the proposal,  
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[t]he CCCTB is not about harmonising corporate tax rates. Nor is it even a first step in that 
direction. I firmly believe that corporate tax rates are an issue of national sovereignty and – so 
long as it is done in a fair manner – something for each Member State to decide for itself, in line 
with national needs (Šemeta 2011: p.3). 
 
The Commission’s efforts to stress its intentions of respecting Member States’ right to set 
their own corporate tax rates reflects that the Commission must have been well aware of 
that this issue is their biggest concern and the main reason why they may reject the 
proposal. By clarifying its intentions, the Commission as an agent therefore aimed at 
convincing the principals of its trustworthiness and at stressing that the proposal would 
not infringe their core rights.  
Concerning the second aspect of how agents provide information to their principals – by 
informing them about the expected consequences of the proposal - the Commission used 
reports and an Impact Assessment on the impacts of the proposed CCCTB. The 
Commission’s 2001 study on company taxation in the European Union intended to show 
the differences in corporate taxation in the European Union and identify those provisions 
which were most likely to impede the functioning of the Internal Market (European 
Commission 2001c: p.1); as well as to suggest some remedies to potential distortions. In 
this study, the Commission proposed solutions (inter alia the CCCTB) and evaluated 
them with regard to their ability to overcome the obstacles that impede the Internal 
Market and their effects on businesses and tax administrations. In the Impact Assessment 
accompanying the proposal for the CCCTB Directive, the Commission analysed the 
expected impacts of the proposal on the distribution of the tax bases between Member 
States (i.e. if some Member States would suffer from losses in tax revenues), the impact 
on the tax administrations’ and businesses’ costs, economy-wide impacts, as well as 
social and environmental impacts (European Commission 2011b: pp.2). Thereby, the 
Commission provided the Member States with information on the potential consequences 
of the CCCTB on their administrations, tax revenues and their economies as a whole.  
As can be seen from the above, the European Commission actively used the strategy of 
informing the principals about its intention and the consequences of the proposed 
directive in order to be perceived as a transparent and trustworthy agent by its principals. 
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7.2.2. Increasing permeability 
Figure 6: Increasing permeability: Commission strategy, intention and aim 
 
 
Agents can open up for third actors’ participation in the legislative process (i.e. increase 
their permeability) in order to gain information and secure their support (Hawkins/Jacoby 
2006: p.209). In this section it is argued that the Commission as the agent actively opened 
up for third parties and tried to include them as much as possible in the decision-making 
process. Applied to the CCCTB case, third actors are companies (mainly represented by 
business organisations such as BusinessEurope) and experts such as academics and 
professionals working in the corporate tax area. In the following, it is outlined how the 
Commission included them in the decision-making process and how it benefitted from 
this.  
 
In the case of the CCCTB, the Commission included relevant stakeholders at several 
instances in order to gain important insights for drafting the proposal from them. The 
Commission conducted informal consultations with business and professional 
associations to draw on their technical expertise and their viewpoints (European 
Commission 2011a: p.7). The Commission also received and published around 40 written 
contributions
37
 from eleven major business organisations in the European Union, 
including inter alia BusinessEurope, Eurochambres and the European Business Initiative 
on Taxation (European Commission 2014e). Apart from contributions made by business 
representatives and representatives of the professions, academic scholars were also 
invited to provide the Commission with their views and insights on several features of the 
proposed system (European Commission 2011a: p.7). Further to these contributions, 
conferences on the CCCTB were held in 2002, 2003, 2008 and 2010, where Member 
State representatives as well as third actors from business, think tanks and academia were 
able to participate and provide their views (ibid.). Through all these consultations with 
third actors, the Commission gained information for drafting a thorough proposal taking 
the business and expert perspective into account.  
                                                          
37
 This figure exclusively entails those publications which are accessible to the public online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/common_tax_base/article_3130_en.htm, 
retrieved 2014-04-14.  
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For the Commission, participation of third actors in the Working Group on the CCCTB 
consisting of national experts was moreover considered as crucial, as “excluding them 
would mean losing their valuable technical and practical experience and it would be more 
difficult to maintain business interest if they were not directly involved” (European 
Commission 2004: p.4). However, representatives of the Member States were 
considerably more reluctant regarding this issue. As it is stated in the first CCCTB 
Working Group Summary Record: 
Some participants [Member State representatives; T.L.] were afraid that if non governmental experts 
are invited to join the Group permanently, tax administrations will be put under pressure and the 
discussion will not be open and clear. […] [N]on governmental experts may be consulted if need be for 
specific information or analyses and that such consultations should be launched on a separate basis (not 
within the regular meetings of the Group) (European Commission 2005b: p.4).  
 
Business representatives and other external experts were thus not allowed to participate in 
the CCCTB Working Group on a regular basis. They were, however, invited to take part 
in extended formats of the working group, which took place in 2005, 2006 and 2007 and 
to provide their input within this framework (European Commission 2007a: p.4; 2011a: 
p.7).  
 
From a principal-agent point of view this is especially interesting, taking into 
consideration that involving third actors is usually conceptualised as a monitoring 
mechanism applied by the principals. Considering the Commission’s wish to include 
relevant stakeholders in the CCCTB Working Group and the Member States’ resistance 
to this, this view does not hold in this case. It can rather be argued that the Commission 
and the business community’s interests regarding the issue overlapped to a high degree, 
as tax-related problems and costs were also perceived as problematic by businesses 
(Radaelli/Kraemer 2008: p.320). The Commission therefore stressed that its proposal was 
backed-up by the business community: 
  
[T]hese discussions and consultations [discussions and meetings with business federations and 
professional organisations, T.L.] have shown a firm support from the business community to the 
initiative of simplifying the current operation of corporate tax systems in the EU and to the 
prospect of removing tax obstacles for businesses that operate in a cross-border environment […] 
(European Commission 2011b: p.6; emphasised in original). 
 
Securing the support of the business community helped the Commission to advocate for 
the CCCTB, as Member States should be interested in creating a favourable business 
environment, in order to secure growth, jobs and tax revenue. The fact that businesses 
back-up the proposal can therefore be viewed as an incentive for them to consider its 
adoption.  
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It can thus be concluded, that the Commission actively opened up for third actors and 
their participation in the process of drafting the CCCTB proposal, within the confines set 
by the Member States. The Commission used third actor participation to gain information 
on the topic in order to be able to draft a thorough and well-informed proposal; and to 
secure the support of the business community in order to convince Member States about 
the advantages of the CCCTB.  
 
 
 
 
7.3. The “post-proposal” phase (2011-2014) 
This phase covers the period following the launch of the proposal, when the Commission 
particularly used framing in order to render the CCCTB more attractive to the Member 
States.  
 
 
7.3.1. Framing 
Figure 7: Framing: Commission strategy, intention and aim 
 
 
A strategy most recently applied by the Commission in advocating for its CCCTB 
proposal is framing. As outlined in the theory chapter, there are two important factors 
when framing an issue:  
 Values and ideas: frames help the agent to make the link between ideas and policy 
choices explicit (Rhinard 2010: pp.58).   
 Window of opportunity: Strategic framing can be facilitated when there is an 
external event which may result in pressures for change and which thereby 
provides an opportunity for using new policy frames (ibid.: p.60; p.79). A window 
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of opportunity in form of an external crisis can moreover contribute to Member 
States being more receptive to Commission proposals (Pollack 1994: p.128).  
In the following, this theoretical concept is applied to the CCCTB proposal. The section 
outlines the identified frame used by the Commission, the values and ideas underlying 
this frame; as well as the window of opportunity.  
 
Table 2: Application of the framing approach to the case 
Identified frame CCCTB as a way to fight tax evasion and avoidance 
Values/ideas Tax fairness, securing Member States’ tax revenues, functioning of 
the Internal Market  
Window of opportunity Financial crisis 
 
The CCCTB proposal was issued by the Commission in 2011, at a time when political 
leaders in the EU were still struggling with the consequences of the financial crisis, which 
started in 2008. Therefore, solving the crisis was considered more important (Van der 
Jagt 2012: p.2) and the proposal was not one of their immediate priorities. However, two 
years later, a public discussion emerged about tax avoidance and evasion
38
 and their 
negative implications on public revenues in the light of the financial crisis. Taxpayers 
faced with severe cuts in public expenditures were simply not able to understand how 
large multinational companies were allegedly able to evade paying taxes (Euractiv 2013; 
Frey 2013). From a principal-agent perspective it can be argued that the European 
Commission as the agent exploited this situation by framing the CCCTB proposal as a 
remedy to tax evasion and avoidance.  
According to the Commission, the main reasons why tax evasion and avoidance occur in 
the EU are that Member States do not cooperate closely enough (European Commission 
2013b: p.1) and because companies can exploit inconsistencies in the different tax 
systems (European Commission 2012: p.6). Moreover, the complicated transfer pricing 
system currently in place has contributed to more tax evasion and avoidance. Transfer 
pricing refers to the principle that prices charged for transactions (e.g. goods and 
services) within multinational companies have to reflect market prices. This rule has been 
introduced in order to prevent multinational companies from reducing their taxable 
income by moving profits from a high-tax country to a low-tax country with the sole 
purpose of avoiding to pay taxes (European Commission 2014f; Frey 2013). This system 
is, however, very difficult to control for national tax authorities and can thus be easily 
abused by multinational companies (Frey 2013). 
                                                          
38
 The difference between these two concepts is a matter of legality. While tax avoidance is legal and 
used in order to save taxes by stretching the tax law to the legal extent possible, evasion designates the 
illegal form of noncompliance with the law in order to reduce the tax burden. In practice, however, there 
is a grey zone between these two (Slemrod/Yitzhaki 2002: p.1428).  
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The Commission argued that introducing the CCCTB would be an important element to 
prevent tax evasion and avoidance. It would increase transparency and solve transfer 
pricing issues. Companies would be allowed to consolidate their tax base across the 
whole EU and consequently, the incentive to move profits from a high-tax to a low-tax 
country in order to avoid paying taxes in the high-tax country would be removed, as this 
would no longer be necessary. Moreover, there would be fewer mismatches in the tax 
systems of the Member States which could be abused by multinational companies 
(European Commission 2011a: p.6; 2013b: p.3). 
This tax evasion and avoidance frame has been used by the Commission to promote the 
CCCTB as a solution to these problems. As a Commission source put it: 
The CCCTB has been raised again and again amongst ministers recently [in 2013; T.L.], because 
originally it was considered as a measure designed to make life easier for business within the EU, 
but now the attractions of the transparency that it would encourage have given it more legs (quoted 
in Euractiv 2013).  
The core values underlying this frame are fairness and securing the efficiency of the tax 
systems of the Member States. According to the Commission, tax evasion and avoidance 
result in considerable losses in revenues for Member States. Moreover, they contribute to 
a competitive disadvantage for honest companies compared to those companies who 
engage in tax avoidance and evasion, thereby distorting the functioning of the Internal 
Market (European Commission 2013b: p.1). As Member States are assumed to share the 
values of fairness and efficiency, it seems reasonable for the Commission as the agent to 
draw on them when promoting the CCCTB.  
The window of opportunity in this case is the financial crisis and the consequences the EU 
is still suffering from. This external event may pressure Member States to action and 
make them more receptive to the Commission’s proposal due to the prospect of 
remedying the massive loss of tax revenue because of tax evasion and avoidance.  
As can be concluded from the above, the European Commission used the tax evasion and 
avoidance frame to bring the CCCTB proposal back on the agenda. The values and ideas 
underlying this frame are in principle expected to be shared by Member States and 
therefore facilitate the likelihood that at least some of them may be receptive to the 
Commission proposal.  
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7.4. Conclusion 
The analysis above has shown that the Commission used seven different strategies in the 
case of the CCCTB proposal. Moreover, there is a tendency that some strategies were 
predominately used in certain phases. The Commission applied the reinterpreting the 
mandate strategy in order to show the link between the Internal Market and tax policy, to 
show how the Internal Market is distorted by the current tax arrangements, and to 
demonstrate how the CCCTB could provide a remedy to this. Shaming was used to 
embarrass Member States and create pressure on them. Advocating for QMV and 
enhanced cooperation and the inclusion of delegated and implementing acts was applied 
in order to circumvent the unanimity requirement, as well as to create pressure on 
principals by warning of political standstill due to this decision-making procedure. This 
strategy would help the Commission as the agent to exploit differing principal 
preferences and moreover increase Community and its own competences. Threatening 
with the ECJ was done in a variety of ways: by warning Member States that the ECJ may 
overrule their tax legislation, that ECJ case law was not enough to ensure a 
comprehensive approach, and by threatening with more infringement proceedings. The 
analysis has found that these four strategies have predominately been applied in the initial 
phase of the proposal.  
Being an informative agent by providing the Commission with information about its 
intentions and the policy consequences of its actions has been found to be another 
strategy the Commission applied in this case. This strategy was used in order to appear 
trustworthy. The increasing permeability strategy consisted of securing the participation 
of third actors in the decision-making process, which served the purpose of gaining 
information and securing their support. Both strategies have been mostly applied in the 
second identified phase. A part of the informative agent strategy (providing the principals 
with information on its intentions) has been applied throughout the whole process.  
Framing was the strategy mainly applied in the last identified phase. By claiming that the 
CCCTB was a solution to tax avoidance and evasion, the Commission used it in order to 
show the link between accepted ideas and values.  
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8. Results of the analysis  
 
What kind of conclusions can be drawn from the analysis above? The seven strategies 
identified from relevant principal-agent literature (reinterpretation, shaming, advocating 
for QMV and enhanced cooperation to circumvent the unanimity requirement, 
threatening with the ECJ, being an informative agent, increasing permeability, framing) 
can, according to the author’s own categorisation, be grouped in three overarching types 
of strategies: first, the confrontational type; second, the cooperative type and third, the 
persuasive type. This categorisation is based on the finding that some strategies applied 
by the Commission followed a similar logic. In the following, these types are outlined 
and conclusions are drawn. After this, instances of Member State counter-strategies found 
in the course of the analysis and the Commission’s reactions to these are discussed. 
Shaming, threatening with the ECJ and the judicial consequences of a failure to act by the 
Member States, as well as trying to advocate for QMV and enhanced cooperation in order 
to be able to exploit principals’ differing preferences can be counted to strategies of the 
confrontational type. The logic underlying these three strategies is to create pressure to 
act on Member States. In the case of shaming, the principals were embarrassed in order to 
push them to action, threatening with the ECJ was supposed to create pressure too; and 
by advocating for QMV and enhanced cooperation, the Commission warned the Member 
States of political standstill due to the unanimity requirement, thereby pressuring them to 
act as well.   
The second identified type of strategy is the cooperative type. This type includes the 
‘informative agent’ strategy as well as a part of the increasing permeability strategy, 
namely the part about receiving information from third actors. The underlying logic is to 
be transparent about the information it possesses, about its intentions and policy 
consequences of the proposal; in order to appear trustworthy. It can be argued that the 
strategy of increasing permeability forms part of both the confrontational and the 
cooperative type. On the one hand, by getting information from third actors and by 
making this information available to the principals the Commission shares information 
with the Member States and proves that it can be trusted. On the other hand, by securing 
third parties’ support, the Commission applies a strategy of the more confrontational 
type, as this creates pressure on the Member States to act.  
Framing and reinterpreting are strategies of the persuasive type. Their inherent logic is to 
convince Member States of the legitimacy of Commission action in this area and of the 
link between accepted values and the proposal.  
It can furthermore be concluded from the analysis that the Commission used different 
types of strategies in the distinct phases identified above. The strategies of the 
confrontational type have been predominantly applied in the initial phase of the process; 
cooperative strategies in the mid-phase (consultation phase), while persuasive strategies 
47 
 
can be found in the initial and the ‘post-proposal’ phase after the proposal was issued. A 
part of the ‘informative agent’ strategy, namely informing the agent about its intentions, 
has been found to be used throughout the whole process.  
It can be argued that the Commission used confrontational strategies in the beginning in 
order to stress the seriousness of the situation and to create enough pressure on them to 
act; also having the enlargement of 2004 in mind. Cooperative strategies have been used 
in the mid-phase, i.e. the phase in which the policy was formulated and information and 
insights gathered, in order to prove to the principals that it is a trustworthy agent and 
honest about its intentions. Moreover, it needed to be ensured that Member States got the 
possibility to take part in the process and that their interests were respected, in order to 
increase the likelihood of the proposal being adopted by at least by some of them in the 
end.  
Strategies of the persuasive type were applied in the initial phase, as well as in the phase 
after the proposal was issued. Reinterpretation was mainly used in the initial phase in 
order to stress the legitimacy of Commission action in a field where no direct mandate to 
act exists and in order to make the link between the Internal Market and Commission 
action in this area clear. However, it was also used in the actual proposal itself in order to 
justify action in this field. Framing as a persuasive strategy was used in order to connect 
widely accepted values with the Commission proposal, to make it more appealing to the 
Member States. It was moreover used in order to get the proposal back on the agenda.  
The analysis has furthermore shown that the agent can only operate within the limits set 
by the Member States. Three instances of Member State strategies to constrain the agent 
have been identified in the course of the analysis. The first was the Member States’ threat 
to create a new body within the framework of the Council to handle tax issues. As 
outlined in section 7.1.2, the Commission reacted with shaming the Member States in 
return, claiming that the lack of progress was their fault, a problem which according to its 
view would not be solved by the creation of a new body. The second instance was the 
Member States’ outright “no” to including third party actors in the CCCTB Working 
Group on a regular basis. The Commission had to accept this, but it was able to secure 
third party participation through extended formats of the CCCTB Working Group, 
through formal and informal consultations. Contrary to the widespread principal-agent 
assumption that third party actors serve as a monitoring mechanism on behalf of the 
Member States, the analysis has shown that the Commission actively tried to include 
relevant stakeholders in order to secure their support. The third instance of Member 
States’ counter-strategies was when several of them issued a reasoned opinion about 
whether the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality were respected in the case of 
the CCCTB. It can be discussed in how far the Commission expected this resistance. 
According to principal-agent assumptions, the agent can anticipate the reaction of its 
principals and adapt its strategies accordingly (Tallberg 2003: p.9). Throughout the whole 
policy-formulation process it became clear that there are some Member States which are 
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strongly opposed to the proposed directive.
39
 The Commission may have anticipated their 
resistance by proposing to introduce it in the framework of enhanced cooperation, thereby 
circumventing those Member States which are against the proposal.  
To summarise, the analysis found that the Commission applied confrontational strategies, 
cooperative and persuasive strategies. Confrontational strategies were mainly applied in 
the initial phase of the CCCTB proposal, cooperative strategies in the mid-phase, while 
persuasive strategies were applied in the beginning and in the phase after the proposal 
was adopted. In-line with principal-agent assumptions, the Commission was not able to 
act entirely autonomously and it was shown that its actions were constrained by the 
Member States. The Commission reacted to the identified counter-strategies applied by 
the Member States by shaming them, by securing third actor participation through other 
channels than the CCCTB Working Group and by proposing the enhanced cooperation 
framework, well knowing that some Member States would oppose the proposal.  
 
  
                                                          
39
 As the Commission noted in its 2004 Non-Paper, “[m]any Member States have initially been very 
cautious, if not hostile in some cases” (European Commission 2004: p.1).  
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9. Conclusion, further discussions and outlook  
 
In this concluding section, the research question is answered; followed by a short 
discussion of the approach of this thesis and its findings, before an outlook on further 
possible areas of research is given.  
It has been found that the Commission applied three different overarching types of 
strategies in the case analysed in this thesis. The first type is confrontational strategies 
consisting of shaming, threatening with the European Court of Justice and the judicial 
consequences of non-action in the area of direct taxation, to circumvent the unanimity 
requirement by advocating for QMV and enhanced cooperation in taxation; as well as a 
part of the increasing permeability strategy (more specifically, to secure support from 
third actors). The second type encompasses cooperative strategies, namely being an 
informative agent; and a part of the increasing permeability towards third actors strategy, 
namely to gain information from third actors. Framing and reinterpretation strategies 
have been identified as the third type, persuasive strategies. It was furthermore found that 
the strategies used varied depending on the phase of the policy formulation process 
reaching from 2001 to 2014. In the initial phase, the Commission mainly applied 
strategies of the confrontational and the persuasive type; the mid-phase was dominated by 
cooperative strategies, while the phase after the proposal was issued was characterised by 
persuasive strategies. Informing the principals about its intentions – an aspect of the 
‘informative agent’ strategy – has been applied throughout the whole process. The 
Commission is not completely independent from the Member State principals; it rather 
has to act within the limits set by them. In three identified instances the Commission had 
to find ways to react to Member States and their strategies for constraining it.  
There are three main contributions this thesis makes to the current state of the research. 
From a theoretical point of view, it offers a comprehensive analysis of the agent and its 
strategies when pursuing its preferences. By focusing on the agent part of the principal-
agent approach, it sheds light on an aspect which has so far been paid less attention to in 
the relevant literature. Moreover, the thesis contributes in general to the scarce political 
science literature on EU tax policy. Considering the fact that not many political scientists 
have conducted research on this topic, it provides the field with some interesting insights 
and thus contributes with important knowledge on the behaviour of a supranational 
institution in the politically sensitive intergovernmental area of taxation. Combining tax 
policy and the principal-agent approach is quite unique, as this has – to the author’s best 
knowledge – never been done before.  
Nevertheless, this kind of research is subject to a number of constraints. First, the 
principal-agent approach has its limitations. By conceptualising the agent as a unitary 
actor it does for example not allow to ‘look inside’ this actor and identify internal drivers 
and conflicts. It might be that the different parts of the Commission responsible for 
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taxation (e.g. the Commissioner and DG TAXUD) pursue different strategies. The 
principal-agent approach does not capture these nuances.  
Second, there are certain methodological challenges research projects like this are 
constrained by. It is in the nature of a case-study approach that only a part of the whole 
picture can be analysed and it is therefore difficult to draw general conclusions from this 
singular case. Moreover, there are certain measurement issues. Measuring actors’ real 
preferences and intentions is difficult, as we cannot read the actors’ minds and - even if 
we asked them - they might not be willing to share their true thoughts with the public. 
Therefore, researchers can only assume that theoretical presumptions capture reality. This 
is not unproblematic, taking into account that the principal-agent approach has been 
criticised for several of its core assumptions, e.g. that the Commission in general is in 
favour of more integration (Pollack 2009: p.134). Moreover, the chosen approach does 
not allow for analysing informal channels such as negotiation and bargaining between the 
Commission and Member States, which might be another important strategy used by the 
agent. The deductive approach applied in this thesis poses another methodological 
challenge, as strategies not based on theoretical assumptions were not captured. There 
might therefore be other strategies the researcher is not aware of.  
Despite these drawbacks, the study nevertheless offers valuable insights and the 
principal-agent approach has proven useful in analysing the Commission as an agent in 
tax policy. It might serve as a point of departure for examining further research questions. 
Could we expect different Commission behaviour in areas where it has a bigger scope 
for action than in taxation, for example in ‘classic’ Community areas such as trade or 
competition policy? One might expect that this is the case, considering that the 
Commission does not have to prove the legitimacy of its actions in the same way; and 
because the unanimity requirement does not apply. Moreover, the current literature on the 
principal-agent approach does not offer explanations of the factors determining what kind 
of strategies the Commission uses. Scholars take strategies to explain why principals 
delegate (e.g. Hawkins/Jacoby 2006), why there are differences in agents’ autonomy (e.g. 
Tallberg 2000), or the legislative success of the Commission’s proposals (e.g. Bailer 
2014); rather than outlining factors that trigger the strategies themselves. Is it external 
factors (such as EU enlargement), internal factors (such as the Commissioner’s 
commitment to an issue), or a combination of both? Future research might examine these 
questions. Furthermore, the Commission’s success of applying the strategies could be 
measured in further projects. Are there any strategies which are more successful than 
others? If yes, which factors determine success in this case?  
As outlined earlier, the CCCTB proposal is still pending; it has not yet been revised by 
the Commission and its final fate is still unclear. In the meantime it should be stressed 
that EU tax policy is everything but “dry, technical and boring” (Genschel/Jachtenfuchs 
2009a: p.7); but rather a highly politically sensitive issue area that deserves much more 
attention from political scientists than it has received so far. 
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Annex B – Member States’ positions on the CCCTB proposal  
 
Table 3 below summarises those Member States who in general tend to be supportive of 
the proposal, those who are opposed to the proposal and those whose position is 
unknown.
43
  
 
Table 3: Member States' positions on the CCCTB proposal 
Supportive (to some extent) Opposed Unknown position 
Austria
44
 Bulgaria (reasoned opinion)
45
 Croatia
46
 
Belgium
47
 Cyprus
48
 Greece
49
 
Czech Republic
50
 Estonia
51
 Hungary
52
 
Denmark
53
 Germany
54
 Portugal
55
 
Finland (supports idea in principle, has 
doubts about certain aspects)
56
 
Ireland (reasoned opinion)
57
  
France
58
 Latvia
59
  
Italy
60
 Malta (reasoned opinion)
61
  
Lithuania
62
 Netherlands (reasoned opinion)
63
  
Luxembourg
64
 Poland (reasoned opinion)
65
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can be identified (CMS 2012: p.11).  
45
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 Ibid. 
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Supportive (to some extent) Opposed Unknown position 
Spain
66
 Romania (reasoned opinion)
67
  
 Slovakia
68
  
 Slovenia
69
  
 Sweden (reasoned opinion)
70
  
 United Kingdom (reasoned 
opinion)
71
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